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ExECUTIvE SUMMARy
This report presents project products to the Commodity Risk Management Group of the World Bank for the development and evaluation of index insurance contracts for smallholder farmers in Malawi, Tanzania, and Kenya. The development of some products we are providing was sup-
ported at no cost by the NSF-funded Center for Research on Environmental Decisions.
Index insurance is a relatively new weather risk management tool. While traditional insurance insures 
against crop failure, index insurance insures for a specific event or risk, such as rainfall deficits. The 
index insurance can be more cost effective since there is no need for in-field assessment of damage 
because payouts are triggered by weather data directly. Index insurance addresses two problems associ-
ated with traditional crop insurance: moral hazard (incentives for a farmer to let a crop die in order to 
get an insurance payout) and adverse selection (in which insurance is priced based on the risks of the 
entire population but only the most vulnerable farmers purchase insurance).
 
However, index insurance only provides partial protection and is therefore only one part of a complete 
risk management package. It is critical that the client have a comprehensive understanding of exactly 
what risks are covered (and what risks are not covered) by the index product so that clients can effec-
tively use the insurance as a part of their risk management system. Products must be transparent and 
completely understandable to the client or they will not be able to play their proper role.
We designed and evaluated contracts for Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania. Because some contracts existed 
for Malawi prior to this project, and since the insurance is in its second year of implementation in 
Malawi, the Malawi initial contracts and implementation are used as a starting point. Following the 
project specification, we have developed in depth analysis, such as process based crop simulations and 
quantitative analysis of historical data, for the Malawi case study. These additional analyses are unique 
to the Malawi case.
In general, the contract development and evaluation process has led to a set of contracts that appear 
to perform extremely well. So much so, that demand in many places has overwhelmed administrative 
capacity to serve clients. As this is an unsubsidized product that is purchased by clients, some indica-
tion of its value can be seen in its market demand. In interviews, farmers have stated that their primary 
strategy for adaptation to climate change is enrollment in the insurance program. 
Much of this success is due to the outstanding input and support from project partners, including 
strong data and analysis support from the Malawi, Kenya, and Tanzania Meteorological services. Be-
cause of their wide range of competencies, it is likely that these Meteorological services could play a 
much expanded role in project scale up. 
 
There are several issues that we addressed in evaluating and improving the initial Malawi 2005 pilot 
contract design process for updated contracts in Malawi Kenya and Tanzania. First, the initial Malawi 
contracts had particular features in the formulas that we modified in order to increase robustness, 
performance, flexibility, and transparency. Second, we extended the design process to include more sta-
tistical analysis so that contracts addressed climate characteristics as well as agronomic features of crops. 
We evaluated and improved the crop water stress calculation techniques to more effectively represent 
drought related risk in the contract. We developed a systematic design methodology that could utilize 
the strengths of each source of imperfect information. Finally, we provided formal mechanisms to 
incorporate financial constraints in the contracts.
 
There are several important issues that have yet to be addressed in the design of future contracts, in 
order to ensure that the product evolves into a fully sustainable and scalable product. It is important to 
build capacity for local design and adaptation of contracts as existing needs change and new needs are 
identified. It is critical that the pace of product upscaling does not exceed the pace of capacity develop-
ment and project improvement. In addition, the design process must be updated in order to allow for 
information in seasonal precipitation forecasts to be utilized in the insurance strategy. Crop breeding 
programs can be integrated into this process. Contracts could be developed further to more elegantly 
address failed sowing issues and sporadic starts to the rainy season. Index contracts and reinsurance 
must be designed acknowledging regional and global climate features, since large scale climate processes 
can lead to negatively correlated seasonal rainfall between regions. 
Work should be done to more accurately and transparently characterize the distributions underly-
ing historical precipitation that lead to losses and payouts beyond historical burn analysis we used for 
improved characterization of risk. Techniques must be developed to interpolate information between 
stations and to use satellite based products. These, and related techniques should be advanced to enable 
a quality product to be established when a new station is installed, to detect data tampering, to reduce 
basis risk, and perhaps enable the availability of index products where met stations are not available. 
Indexes should be explored to cover additional risks, such as excess rainfall. It is worthwhile to utilize 
economic contract theory to develop incentives that discourage tampering and encourage accurate farm 
reporting. Contracts could be designed to reveal the value of insurance through market transactions. It 
is important to develop communication tools for cooperative design, education of contract issues, and 
exercises to test for farmer understanding of products. 
In this report, we describe our project products to World Bank’s Commodity Risk Management Group (CMRG) in the development and evaluation of index insurance contracts for smallholder farmers in Malawi, Tanzania, and Kenya. The development of some products we are providing was 
supported at no cost by the NSF-funded Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. 
Index-insurance is one type of weather risk management that has recently developed as a potential tool 
to reduce weather risk in agriculture. While traditional insurance insures against crop failure (actual 
loss), index insurance insures for a specific event or risk, such as rainfall deficits (Skees 1999). Thus, 
the index insurance removes one or more production risks, but does not account for the loss itself. This 
method addresses two problems associated with traditional crop insurance: moral hazard (where farm-
ers have incentive to let their crops fail in order to receive a payout) and adverse selection (where those 
farmers less skilled at farming purchase the insurance, resulting in higher premium levels and more 
frequent payouts). Since the index insurance only covers a specific risk, it only provides partial protec-
tion and is therefore only one part of a complete risk management package. The index insurance also 
becomes a more affordable option, in that there is no need for in-field assessment of damage, as damage 
is able to be tracked by weather data directly (in the case of rainfall, a rain gauge would be the device 
used).
The Malawi experience provides an example of the potential for using index insurance in developing 
countries to assist emerging markets and increase productivity of small holder farmers, with a bundled 
index insurance, loan, and input package in its second year of implementation. Our project supports 
this implementation. Partners include the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi 
(NASFAM), in conjunction with the Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM), the Malawi 
Rural Finance Company Limited (MRFC), the Insurance Association of Malawi, and the Malawi Me-
teorological Service, with support from the World Bank CRMG and IRI. ICRISAT and the Chitedze 
Agricultural Research Station provided important and influential input in the design process.
Following the project Terms of Reference, we designed and evaluated contracts for Malawi, Kenya and 
Tanzania. Because some contracts existed for Malawi prior to this project, and since the insurance is in 
its second year of implementation in Malawi, the Malawi initial contracts and implementation are used 
as a starting point for other contracts and countries. Following the project specification, we have de-
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veloped in depth analysis, such as process based crop simulations and quantitative analysis of historical 
data, for the Malawi case study. These additional analyses are unique to the Malawi case.
Small holder farmers in Malawi have reported that they would be able to increase their yields and 
income if they were able to buy the higher quality inputs (hybrid seeds and fertilizer) necessary for 
increased production. Illustrating the potential benefits for maize, estimates of national maize yield for 
Malawi for the 2006/2007 growing season show local varieties of maize yielding about 50% less maize 
per hectare than the hybrid maize (Malawi Department of Meteorological Services 2007). In the past, 
many small holder farmers have been unable to purchase these inputs, such as the hybrid maize seed, 
fertilizer, and hybrid groundnuts, because they lack the necessary capital.
Microfinance institutions in Malawi have been uncomfortable providing loans to these farmers because 
they face high risk of crop failure, making it questionable if the farmer would be capable of paying back 
the loan. Rainfall deficits are a dominant risk faced by farmers in Malawi. Index insurance has been 
used as a means of removing the risk of rainfall deficits, supplying the microfinance institution with the 
confidence necessary to give the farmer the loan and the farmer with the capital necessary to purchase 
higher quality inputs, and in turn increase productivity and income.
The insurance is a part of a finance/production bundle. Illustrating with the Malawi groundnut ex-
ample, the package is designed for 1 acre of production. To be eligible, a farmer must be within 20km of 
one of the met stations in the program. A typical groundnut package consists of a loan (~4500 Malawi 
Kwacha or ~$35) that covers the groundnut seed cost (~$25, ICRISAT bred), the insurance premium 
(~$2), and tax (~$0.50). Upon signing the paperwork, the farmer receives a bag of groundnut seed 
sufficient for 1 acre of production and an insurance certificate for a policy with a maximum payout of 
the loan size plus interest (~$7). The prices vary, of course, by weather station and crop. Farmers are 
organized into joint liability groups of approximately 10-20 members. The farmers plant the groundnut 
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seed, and at the end of the season provide their yields to the farm association, which markets the yields. 
Proceeds and insurance payouts are used to pay off the loan, with profits returned to the farmer.
In Kenya and Tanzania, similar products are being developed. In Tanzania, Pride Tanzania, the Tanza-
nia Meteorological Service, and Technoserve are some of the partners. In Kenya, some of the partners 
are the Kenya Meteorological Service, FSD Kenya, ECLOF, Equity, CIC. The parameters for all 
contracts are presented in Appendix 1.
In general, the contract development and evaluation process has led to a set of contracts that appear 
to perform extremely well–so much so, that demand in many places has overwhelmed administrative 
capacity to serve clients. In interviews, farmers have stated that their primary strategy for adaptation to 
climate change is enrollment in the insurance program. 
As the loan/insurance are unsubsidized products purchased by clients, some indication of their value 
can be seen in its market transactions. Since thousands of loan/insurance have been voluntarily pur-
chased by farmers in Malawi, the price that they have paid provides a minimum bound on the value 
they place on the product. Much of this success is due to the outstanding input and support from 
project partners, including strong data and analysis support from the Malawi, Kenya, and Tanzania 
Meteorological services. Because of their wide range of competencies, it is likely that these Meteo-
rological services could play a much expanded role in project scale up. It is important to ensure that 
mechanisms exist to provide resources for Meteorological agencies for the necessary data collection, 
cleaning, reporting, and analyses.
For the future, it is critical that the pace of product upscaling does not exceed the pace of capacity 
development and project improvement. If pilot contracts and stakeholders cannot evolve at a pace 
exceeding scale up, pilot contracts may be extended beyond their limits. If financial stakeholders do 
not have the sufficient understanding and capability to update the products, they may not understand 
the important limitations of index products, and farmers may not understand what risks the contracts 
do not provide protection for. This is particularly important for index products, since both the provider 
and client must fully understand that the product does not protect against all losses, and must under-
stand how to build risk protection against the risks the contract does not address. 
There are several issues that we addressed in evaluating and improving the initial Malawi 2005 pilot 
contract design process for updated contracts in Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania. First, the initial Malawi 
contracts had particular features in the formulas that were modified in order to increase robustness, 
performance, flexibility, and transparency. Second, given the deterministic agronomic modeling focus 
in the initial Malawi contract design, it was important to extend the design process to include more 
statistical analysis to arrive at contracts tuned both to agronomic features of crops as well as climate 
characteristics. We evaluated and improved the crop water stress calculation techniques to more ef-
fectively represent drought related risk in the contract. Since agronomic models have a finite level of 
skill in reflecting actual losses, and since each source of information about losses has limits in terms of 
reliability and accuracy, we developed a systematic design methodology that could utilize the strengths 
of each source of imperfect information. Finally, we provided formal mechanisms to incorporate finan-
cial constraints in the contracts. See Contract Design and Reference Section 2.
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There are several important issues that have yet to be addressed in the design of future contracts, in 
order to ensure that the product evolves into a fully sustainable and scalable product. Perhaps the most 
important is to build capacity for local design and adaptation of contracts as existing needs change and 
new needs are identified. In addition, the design process must be updated in order to allow for informa-
tion in seasonal precipitation forecasts to be utilized in the insurance strategy. Crop breeding programs 
can be integrated into this process, leading to varieties that are adapted to play the best role possible in 
the bundled insurance/credit/forecast system. Contracts could be developed further to more elegantly 
address failed sowing issues and sporadic starts to the rainy season. Index contracts and reinsurance 
must be designed acknowledging regional and global climate features, since large scale climate processes 
typically lead to negatively correlated seasonal rainfall between regions. Work should be done to more 
accurately and transparently characterize the distributions underlying historical precipitation that lead 
to losses and payouts to bring design and pseudo-pricing beyond historical burn analysis to utilize 
Monte Carlo based simulation for improved characterization of risk. Techniques should be developed 
to interpolate information between stations and to use satellite based products. 
 These, and related techniques should be advanced to enable a quality product to be established when 
a new station is installed. These techniques would be critical for other issues, such as detecting data 
tampering, reducing basis risk, and perhaps enabling the availability of index products where met sta-
tions are not available. It is worthwhile to utilize economic contract theory to develop incentives that 
discourage tampering and encourage accurate farm reporting. Contracts could be designed to reveal the 
value of insurance through market transactions. It is important to develop communication tools for co-
operative design, education of contract issues, and exercises to test for farmer understanding of products. 
Indexes should be explored to cover additional risks, such as excess rainfall. See Design Issues that Must 
be Addressed in the Future in the next section.
This report is one of the deliverables for the project. Another deliverable for this project is the R pro-
gramming code that we developed to support our contract design and analysis. It is not finalized robust 
code. It is not designed to be a tool, and it contains outdated code fragments not used in our final 
analyses. It is presented for the sake of transparency in analysis to serve as additional documentation on 
the methods and data we used. An additional deliverable for the project is the Contract Communica-
tion Spreadsheet that illustrates each index contract. This was produced with the support of the NSF 
funded Center for Research on Environmental Decisions at no cost to the project.
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The design process leading up to the original Malawi contracts is used as a starting point for the updated design process. Most of the basic features of the original contracts were retained and built upon. We proceed with an overview of the basic contract structure and design process. This 
overview is followed by sections that elaborate on specific issues.
Basic structure of contract
All contracts were based on dekadal (10 day)1 rainfall summaries, and dekadal totals were limited to 
maximum levels (caps). Any rainfall above the cap within a dekad is not considered in the payment 
formulas. A “sowing window” is set for each contract with a start dekad and an end dekad. The con-
tract calendar begins in the first dekad of the 
sowing window for which rainfall exceeds a 
threshold amount, the “sowing trigger.” If the 
trigger is not exceeded during the window, a 
failed sowing condition is signaled, a failed 
sowing payment is paid, and the contract is 
terminated. If the sowing trigger is reached, 
the contract calendar begins with the dekad 
in which the trigger was reached. The contract 
calendar is broken up in to a number of phases 
of several dekads each (three phases were used 
in most cases). Payouts are calculated using 
simple piecewise linear formulas of the sum 
of capped dekadal rainfall occurring over the 
phase. 
The payout function for each phase has three 
parameters, a trigger, an exit, and a maximum payout. If the capped rainfall total during a particular 
CONTRACT DESIGN
1 The first dekad of each month is defined from the 1st to the 10th of the month; the second from the 11th to 
the 20th of the month; the third, from the 21st to the end of the month, can have from 8 to 11 days.
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phase is more than the trigger, no payout occurs for that phase. If the rainfall total is less than the exit, 
the maximum payout is rewarded. If the rainfall total is between the trigger and exit, the payout is 
linearly interpolated between the zero level payout at the trigger and the maximum payout at the exit 
using the simple linear formula below (with an example illustrated in Figure 3.2).
Payout = (1 – (Rainfall Sum – Exit) / (Trigger – Exit)) Max Payout
For a description of how this formula was changed from the initial contracts, see Reference Section 
3. The total payout is the sum of the payouts for each phase and limited to the maximum payout size. 
Contract timing and parameters are determined using agronomic models and rainfall data in a numeri-
cal optimization that minimizes the variance in income that a farmer would face subject to a maximum 
premium constraint, as described in the following sections.
Design process
The design process begins with gathering initial information of crop and climate characteristics (see 
data requirements Appendix 6.). As with any business, in farming, many of the details of cost, produc-
tivity, and risk exposure are proprietary or personal and may be carefully guarded if the producer is not 
naive. If fully revealed, they could put the producer in a disadvantageous position with competitors, 
banks, or insurance companies in negotiations. This ‘private information’ might be hypothetically used 
by a bank, insurance company, or input provider to calculate how high rates, fees and prices might be 
raised above cost before a farmer would step away from the negotiating table. Therefore, the design 
process must be compatible with a business negotiation environment in which players may lose if they 
show all their cards. We must have design strategies that can lead to contracts in a setting in which 
players can reveal as much personal private information as they feel comfortable with. 
In the original contract design process, insurance coefficients were directly calculated using crop 
modeling parameters. In the improved design process, this is merely the starting point. Since contract 
parameters from the more complete design process must now systematically reflect a combination of 
agronomic, climatic, and financial features they are not directly interpretable in terms of Water Require-
ment Satisfaction Index (WRSI) calculations. 
Sowing Conditions
The WRSI based model is used as a mechanism to represent expert information in a mathematical 
form. See http://www.fao.org/ag/AGL/aglw/cropwater/cwinform.stm and CRMG 2005. Reference 
Section 4 and Appendix 5 of this report explain the WRSI model in greater detail as well as our evalu-
ation of alternate WRSI models. In the WRSI model, the beginning of the growing season, length of 
the season, timing of crop growth, the timing of various developmental stages, and the timing of vulner-
ability to water stress must be explicitly assumed. If the timing assumptions are incorrect, the simulation 
will predict water stress in inappropriate parts of the season. Therefore the WRSI based model is only 
as useful as the information used to calibrate its parameters, and its timing assumptions must be verified 
with farmers. When inconsistencies are found, or new information is available, it is important to update 
the parameters to reflect the fundamental stresses to the crop. The initial sowing condition (in mm of 
1
precipitation/dekad) is selected based on FEWSNET and FAO criteria (following CRMG 2005) and 
adjusted to be as consistent as possible with common planting schedules observed in the field. An initial 
selection of the dekadal cap is also selected using the WRSI based calculations (again following CRMG 
2005).
Selecting Phases
The information on crop growth phases from the WRSI model calibration are used in the initial selec-
tion of dekads for the sowing window and 
contract phases. Strategic trade-offs must 
be considered in order to determine phase 
timing. Phases may be timed to directly 
coincide with all growth stages. The phases 
may represent grouped growth stages to 
yield a more simplified contract. Alternately, 
growth stages may be divided in order to 
more accurately target growth stress. 
The selection of phase length involves a 
trade-off. Phases that are too short may lead 
to a contract that is out of sync with the 
actual production process, one that misses 
a critical dry spell because the contract 
calendar does not exactly match the crop 
phonological stage. If additional dekads are 
included in a contract phase before and after 
anticipated vulnerability, then it is more likely that the vulnerable growth stage will fall in the anticipat-
ed contract phase when the contract is implemented. On the other hand, inclusion of additional dekads 
to a phase means that the phase total will be less sensitive to dry dekads within the phase, potentially 
averaging out a significant dry spell. Growth stages for which there is little or no stress might be elimi-
nated from the contract (particularly if these are the final drying stages of the crop).
Determining Payout Frequencies and Working with Price Constraints
In designing the insurance contracts, there are financial constraints. A contract must payout at a rate 
that is approximately equal to the demanded frequency. In addition, the contract cannot be too expen-
sive. Ranges for payout frequency and price constraints must be determined through interviews with 
financial stakeholders and farmers. In order to cover losses for a given insurance price, there is a balance 
between a higher frequency of smaller-sized, partial payouts, and a lower frequency of large payouts. A 
larger deductible (higher triggers) leads to larger, less frequent payouts. Raising the exits increases the 
size of payouts without changing the times when payouts would occur. See Reference Section 1.
Incorporating Climate Features
The WRSI model parameters should not be taken as a definitive predictor of crop behavior. They are 
merely a starting point because much of the protection that an insurance contract provides is climate 
driven, not crop vulnerability driven. A crop that is adapted for the local climate will have low water 
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stress vulnerability during the parts of the season that are typically dry. Drought vulnerability is a bal-
ance between the particular strengths of the crop and the water stress challenges presented by the local 
climate and a drought protection contract must explicitly address this balance in its design. It is there-
fore important to design contracts that balance agronomic parameters with climate features. This bal-
ance is evident even in the way that water stress models are applied to forecast yields. The FAO group 
that initially developed the WRSI model does not directly apply it when forecasting yields. Instead they 
recommend a regression based prediction using variables that are inputs to the water stress model.
Optimization
In order to arrive at a contract, a numerical contract optimization is performed on a WRSI based crop 
loss measure associated with the rainfall data (see Reference Section 6). We have developed code for the 
R statistical system to perform much of our analysis. The objective function of this optimization is to 
minimize the variance in losses less insurance payments subject to the insurance price constraint. Be-
cause the final price of the contract is determined through negotiations between stakeholders, an unof-
ficial “pseudo price” is used following standard and transparent risk pricing methods (see Appendix 2). 
The triggers of the contracts are the decision variables for the optimizer. In other words, the optimizer 
minimizes the variance of losses (see Reference Section 5 for details on the loss proxy) that a hypo-
thetical farmer would face if that farmer had purchased the insurance by adjusting the triggers while 
maintaining a maximum insurance pseudo price. In order to ensure the price must not go above the 
constraint, when the optimizer raises the level of one trigger, it lowers the levels of the others. Therefore 
the task of the optimizer is to determine the relative levels of the triggers.
Because this is a complex optimization problem, the optimization engine cannot be guaranteed to find 
a global optimum, but instead will recover a local optimum that is best adapted from the initial guess 
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provided. In essence, the engine cannot determine the best strategy for a contract, but can tune that 
strategy to be most efficient. In addition, there are design trade-offs that the optimizer is ill suited to 
make, particularly given the high level of private information about risk exposure and risk preferences 
in the index insurance design problem. Since it is preferable to have many of these trade-offs explicitly 
negotiated between stakeholders as opposed to decided by a computer, the optimization algorithm 
is purposefully focused to address cost effectiveness trade-offs. Therefore it is important to apply the 
optimizer to a variety of alternate contract strategies. In order to uncover potentially effective contracts, 
it is worthwhile to perform an optimization run with each one of the triggers dramatically larger than 
the others (see Reference Section 1). 
The trade-off between payout frequency and payout size for contracts resulting from the optimization 
process can be adjusted by modifying the exits. Lowering triggers helps to reduce the payout frequency 
for a given price, while raising them increases the frequency. When additional contract strategies are 
necessary to meet all of the constraints a contract faces, it may be useful to run the optimizer with an 
artificially high or low price constraint to result in a contract that has the desired features, and then to 
use the resulting contract as the initial guess for a contract with appropriate price constraints. 
There are a variety of loss indicators that may have some relevance, so it is worthwhile to assess the 
draft contracts against these indicators as well. For the crops that we have designed drought stress 
contracts for, we have determined that losses derived from a WRSI index using daily precipitation and 
with seasonally varying water stress weights is the most effective benchmark for applying the optimiza-
tion engine (see Reference Section 4). 
It is important to note that WRSI simulations are likely not to be the most accurate representation of 
total yields and may under-represent the risk faced by the farmer. However, they are a relatively robust, 
practical, and transparent tool to represent the dynamics of crop water stress in contract design, so long 
as they are not interpreted as representing more information than they embody. For other applications, 
where forecasts of absolute yield levels are required (such as national yield forecast systems), related, but 
alternately specified water stress algorithms that combine water stress indicators with statistical yield 
analysis are preferable (Chavula 2006).
Additional Information Sources for Contract Design
Historical Yield Data
Historical district level yield data is one information source that may be available to assist in contract 
design. In addition, it is likely to represent a different set of farmers using a different set of practices, 
inputs, and conditions than those being insured. As opposed to simulation output, all sources of yield 
variation are represented in the time series, instead of only drought stress related losses. This means 
that a long time series is necessary in order to characterize the drought related yield losses in historical 
data. However, this data is typically of limited quality, consistency and only available for brief periods 
of time. Since it is the average of yields over a district, much of the variance in individual production 
is lost, masking the potential severity of individual losses. However, it provides an independent, non-
model based source of information for assessment of the contract. Therefore, it is typically not the best 
choice to optimize a contract using this information when a better loss indicator is available. Though, it 
is important to gauge the performance of a proposed contract against historical yields to insure unless 
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the time series is so short that the contract being considered does not have any payouts during that 
period. If the contract were to perform extremely badly against events represented in the historical data 
set, stakeholders should be comfortable with the reasons for this lack of performance before accepting 
the contract. 
Process Based Crop Models
For Malawi, we have studied the effectiveness of utilizing output from process based crop models that 
are more sophisticated than WRSI based models. We recommend that these models not be used as the 
benchmark for optimization, as they tend to be highly sensitive to assumptions for parameters. They are 
more likely to represent the losses accrued by an individual farmer with very particular characteristics 
than the entire community to be covered by the contract. Therefore, their utility is primarily in develop-
ing a more detailed understanding of why crops might be stressed in a particular year, improving the 
WRSI model assumptions, and checking the robustness of a draft contract (see Reference Section 4 and 
Appendix 5).
Farmer Interviews and Feedback 
Contracts should be gauged against farmer recollections of difficult years, particularly if the farmers 
can recall the growing phase during which a crop faced difficulties in a particular year. As with the 
historical yields, this information is likely to be noisy. However, it also provides an important gauge 
that could distinguish a robustly performing contract from one that is inappropriately designed. This 
interaction is important for several additional reasons. Since the timing of stress in the WRSI model is 
directly assumed, it is worthwhile to verify with farmers that the sowing times and periods during the 
season in which the crop faces the most stress are those assumed in the WRSI model, and represented 
in the contract phase timing choices. This interaction provides farmers with the opportunity to reveal 
more private information if they feel it is worthwhile to do so for an improved design. Finally, it helps 
ensure that farmers understand what the product is, what types of events it will cover, and what types of 
events that it will not cover so that they can make educated insurance purchases and farm management 
choices. In this process, we have cooperated in the development of a tool to aid in the communication 
of contracts with farmers and test if farmers are able to understand the contract (see Reference Section 
10 and Appendix 10).
Contract Evaluation 
A variety of performance indicators are produced by the software, and it is worthwhile to assess the 
draft contract performance with respect to each of the indicators. 
Payout Timing
The timing of payouts may be important. In a year with severe losses, a farmer may be more concerned 
with the existence of a payout at all than how exactly it corresponds to revenue losses. In discussions 
with farmers about past years it is much more likely that they will recall the year of a historical loss than 
the exact size of the loss. Therefore the timing of payouts may be the only diagnostic available to gauge 
contracts against these types of data sources. The timing of losses and payouts is presented in the output 
of the software in a table ranking the losses from largest to smallest and indicating if there was a payout 
in each year. In addition, the software summarizes the number of payouts in the worst half, third, and 
quarter of the losses. 
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Correlation between Payouts and Losses
It should be noted that the correlation between the payouts and losses, although a useful diagnostic for 
distinguishing a well performing contract from one that performs badly, is not the appropriate objec-
tive function for the optimization engine. Achieving the highest level of correlation between payouts 
and losses is not the primary design objective. Because it is scale neutral, a contract that provides very 
little protection, but provides the protection at effective times, can have a correlation that is much 
higher than a contract that provides more protection. In addition, it is important to note, that in our 
analysis, the correlation between model-based losses and payouts is artificially inflated when there are 
failed sowing conditions because our assumptions for a sowing failure are identical in the contract and 
WRSI based loss model. This effect is intensified because failed sowing conditions are typically high 
payout events modeled as a complete loss. Nevertheless, the standardized correlation provides a useful 
parameter for contract assessment, and all of the contracts presented here have high correlations 
with payments.
Manual Adjustment to meet Stakeholder Needs
Following the automated optimization process, it is typically important to adjust contract parameters 
slightly to better represent objectives not directly modeled in the optimization. In addition, the use of 
triggers and exits that are specified to a high level of precision may incorrectly suggest that the data 
sources driving the analysis are more precise than they actually are. Since it is important that farmers 
gauge the contract against their own experience, it may be worthwhile to adjust contract parameters to 
round numbers to help ensure that the farmer understands the appropriate level of precision that the 
contracts reflect. Since contracts are typically bundled with a loan, the central purpose of the contract 
is to protect the loan. For this reason, the goals in contract design must be different than in instances 
where the contract is simply addressing a farmer’s risk. The bundling of the contract with the loan 
means that more stakeholders are involved, whose input must be taken into account in contract design.
Following this cross verification process, the contract design is repeated, updating the WRSI and 
contract phase parameters to most effectively represent the new information gained in the feedback 
and evaluation process until contracts are developed that all stakeholders are comfortable with in terms 
of their properties, performance, and complexity (see Reference Section 7).
Design issues that must be addressed in the future
Before presenting the design process we emphasize that these contracts represent an early step in a 
technology that must continually evolve with upscaling and changing needs. There are several im-
portant issues that have yet to be addressed. Perhaps the most important is to build capacity for local 
design and adaptation of contracts as existing needs change and new needs are identified. The potential 
for this capacity exists in the National Met agencies, local financial institutions and farmer oriented 
organizations, but it cannot be harnessed unless specific technical skills are developed and supported. 
Capacity Building 
The need to build capacity for local design and adaptation of contracts increases in importance if the 
insurance is successful in allowing economic development. A product that is designed to provide a 
stepping stone for farmers into the cash economy must adapt once these farmers (who previously did 
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not have access to loans, savings, or cash) make the transition and begin to establish credit ratings 
and accumulate money in savings accounts. With each step of the development process, the insurance 
tools must grow with the clientele. 
It is critical that the pace of product upscaling does not exceed the pace of capacity development and 
project improvement. If pilot contracts and stakeholders cannot evolve at a pace exceeding scale up, 
pilot contracts may be extended beyond their limits. If financial stakeholders do not have the suf-
ficient understanding and capability to update the products, they may not understand the important 
limitations of index products, and farmers may not understand what risks the contracts do not provide 
protection for. This is particularly important for index products, since both the provider and client 
must fully understand that the product does not protect against all losses, and must understand how to 
build risk protection against things the contract does not address (see Reference Section 7).
The analytical expertise to link a contract formula to crop losses or otherwise address basis risk may 
not exist in a financial institution established for the provision of traditional insurance. The impor-
tance of properly designed contracts is not always central to the provider with experience in tradi-
tional insurance because the provider is used to relying on adjusters to directly observe loss instead 
of performing research to model the loss. In addition, since the provider does not directly face the 
consequences of basis risk, substantial capacity building may be necessary to ensure that the problem 
is addressed in scale-up. Even with a well designed contract, it is possible to increase the risk that a 
farmer faces by ensuring maximum liabilities that are too large relative to the risks faced, which could 
pose a danger if a product is mainstreamed without appropriate stakeholder capacity.
Seasonal Precipitation Forecasts and Spatial Climate Features
In the future, the design process must be updated in order to allow for information in seasonal precip-
itation forecasts to be utilized in the insurance strategy. For full scale up, contracts must be robust to 
inter-temporal adverse selection. That is, a client should not be able to use the forecast to undermine 
the financial stability of the insurance through a strategy such as purchasing insurance only in years 
with drought forecasted. For the current pilot implementations, for which total demand is greater 
than the pilot size, this is not yet an issue. However, as projects are upscaled, it becomes increasingly 
important. In addition, a failure to integrate forecasts and insurance would result in an important 
opportunity being lost. It is likely that the insurance could be used in concert with the forecast to yield 
substantial benefits by reducing losses in bad years and allowing additional intensification in good 
years. These issues are discussed through the exploratory analysis presented in Reference Section 9.
Index contracts and reinsurance must be designed acknowledging regional and global climate features, 
since large scale climate processes typically lead to negatively correlated seasonal rainfall between re-
gions. For example, an ENSO state that is associated with higher probabilities of drought in Southern 
Africa is correlated with ample rainfall in the Greater Horn of Africa. On smaller scales, year to year 
climate processes often lead to rainfall occurring on alternate sides of a mountain range. Even when 
the location of rainfall cannot be predicted, an understanding of the negative correlations between 
regions could be used to reduce costs. An exploratory presentation of this issue is provided in Refer-
ence Section 8.
20
Accurate Characterization of Probability Distributions
Work should be done to more accurately and transparently characterize the distributions underlying 
historical precipitation that lead to losses and payouts to bring design and pricing beyond historical 
burn analysis to utilize Monte Carlo based simulation for improved characterization of risk. Currently, 
for the sake of transparency and simplicity, pricing and design analysis is primarily based on analysis 
directly using historical payouts. Since this analysis approach leads to products and prices that are sensi-
tive to the particular features of one or two historical events, they can overemphasize the importance of 
the specifics of these events. This improvement in the characterization of probabilities is important both 
in contract design and in final pricing.
The demands of index insurance design taxes current methods to model the underlying distributions, 
simulate rainfall, or characterize the probability weights in distributional tails. A technique must be able 
to accurately represent probabilities for variables such as the rainfall at each point in the season, the cor-
relations between points in the season for a particular year, and the frequency of rare catastrophic events 
that may not have been exhibited in the available historical data. 
It is possible that a particular technique, although sophisticated, might mischaracterize probabilities, 
and that this mischaracterization could be undetected due to the complexity of the technique. If results 
of a given technique are entirely driven by model assumptions, these assumptions may be masked by 
complexity of the technique, leading to misinformed decision making. Therefore it is important to 
evaluate and extend current techniques to ensure that contracts can be appropriately designed and 
priced making full and transparent use of the information available.
When only short historical data series are available, techniques must be available to appropriately quan-
tify the uncertainty in the probabilities of events so that this uncertainty can be priced into products, 
and insurance can be designed to cover anticipated risks. This is particularly important when new Met 
stations are brought online to provide index insurance for additional regions. 
When a new station is established, typically there are several alternatives to characterize the histori-
cal behavior of rainfall. These can include sub-standard station-based data, data from relatively nearby 
stations, and satellite based products. As scale up occurs, it is important to develop transparent and 
robust techniques to utilize these data sources to enable a quality product to be established when a new 
station is installed. These techniques would be critical for other issues, such as detecting data tamper-
ing, reducing basis risk, and perhaps enabling the availability of index products where met stations are 
not available. In the Malawi case, it may be worthwhile to use nearby stations to study issues of rainfall 
interpolation and basis risk. For example, the Lilongwe and Chitedze stations are approximately 25 km 
apart, so they have overlapping areas of coverage, with EPA (sub district) level historical yield data and 
extensive research on local groundnut drought stress.
Issues regarding contract design
The bundling of index insurance with other contracts (such as loan contracts) has not been fully ad-
dressed in economic contract theory (the theory of design of contracts). 
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Through application of contract theory it may be possible to use the strengths of the index based con-
tract to reduce moral hazard issues in lending, instead of simply reducing the risk to the lender. One 
result might be contracts that provide incentives for farmers to accurately report rainfall or yields. This 
analysis might also allow market based valuation of the insurance product and tests to determine if the 
farmers understand the product. 
Evaluation Issues
In valuation, nascent bundled insurance products are more complex than evaluation of subsidized 
products that have existed for several years (such as scholarships), so these studies must be developed 
with considerable design finesse. Since the insurance product is a non-subsidized voluntary market 
transaction, there is baseline evidence for value of the product. The value of the bundled product is, of 
course equal to, or greater than the value paid for it.
Since the bundle is complex, and designing studies of its value would require understanding the role of 
varying basis risk, the multiple elements of the finance package, the implications of missing markets, 
the non-continuous nature of the package, and the constraints imposed in order to arrive at a workable 
package. It may be possible to design contracts that facilitate the valuation of the product in a seam-
less manner. The insurance market may provide evidence of the value of complimentary sources of risk 
reduction, such as forecasts. The study design for such efforts will need to be carefully engineered, and 
may require strategic use of partially subsidized products in order to enable valuation of individual pack-
age components.
Communication Tools for Farmers and Stakeholders
Since index insurance only provides partial coverage from risk, it is important that farmers who pur-
chase the insurance understand exactly what the insurance does, and does not cover. In addition, index 
insurance is typically applied because private information problems make traditional insurance (and 
uninsured loans) infeasible. Design of the insurance must be able to incorporate the essential input 
from farmers without forcing them to reveal private information that might be used against them by 
competitors or in negotiations. Thus those designing the insurance will typically not have the full set of 
information available. Instead insurance requires design input from all levels of stakeholders, including 
farmers, and the benefits and limitations of the products must be completely understood by the farmers. 
It is important to develop communication tools for cooperative design, education of contract issues, and 
exercises to test for farmer understanding of products.
Addressing Additional Risks
It will be important to investigate the possibility of using index insurance to address additional risks, 
such as those associated with excess rainfall, or more complex crops. Crop problems such as aflotoxin 
might be addressed by building upon aflotoxin early warning models being developed at the University 
of Georgia by ICRISAT for groundnuts in West Africa. Because models for these more sophisticated 
problems have much lower levels of accuracy as models for drought stress in annual crops, it is not 
possible to use model output as the foundation for contract design. Therefore, a much higher level of 
communication with experts, farmers, and other stakeholders will be necessary in order to design these 
products, so it is important to develop stakeholder capacity and cooperative design and educational tools 
for this purpose.
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Covering Failed Sowing Events
It may be worthwhile to develop a more sophisticated coverage of failed sowing events. Because these 
are currently a binary condition in the contract, a single mm of rainfall could lead to a full contract 
payout or no payout at all. Therefore, if the rainfall is close to the critical levels, issues of measurement 
accuracy may become problematic. Sowing problems may occur due to a sporadic start of the rainy 
season as opposed to no rainfall at all. In addition, since a failed sowing event occurs early in the season, 
there are an array of options that a farmer might chose to avoid losses on the scale that would occur if 
the crop were to fail late in the season. In the current contracts, we have explored adjusting the maxi-
mum payout associated with a failed sowing event and have also used payouts in the first phase as a 
mechanism to provide coverage for sporadic rains early in the season. However, it is likely that it would 
be worthwhile to develop simple and transparent but more continuous and effective mechanisms for 
addressing sowing failure. A brief discussion of one strategy is mentioned in Appendix 8.
Integrating local and regional experts
As scale up occurs, further efficiencies could be identified by closer integration with local and regional 
experts. Groups such as ICRISAT advocated strongly that they be more involved in the package design, 
as they have a family of varieties that could be applied, have yield and phonological timing trials with 
NASFAM farmers, and have a long term breeding program that could be integrated with the long 
term plan of the project. Flexibility in the packaging might provide farmers with the seed (or portfolio 
of seeds) suited to their labor availability and other factors. In addition, since the groundnut insurance 
and loan package is being used for some seed multiplication, groups such as ICRISAT could play a 
role in preserving the identity of the variety, helping to implement a system to insure seed identities are 
maintained. 
1. Design Illustration
In order to illustrate the design process, we discuss the example of the process of designing the 2006 
Chitedze groundnut contracts. This discussion is not intended to be a complete documentation of the 
precise process undertaken, but instead it is an illustration of the main issues in a typical design exercise. 
The starting point for the design was a draft contract provided by the World Bank CRMG based on 
the 2005 Chitedze groundnut contracts. These were contracts using the 2005 phase payout function 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The growing season of 14 dekads had been selected, split into three phases. 
The phases were set with phase 1 (dekads 1 to 3) designed to target the establishment and vegetative 
growth, phase 2 (dekads 4 to 8) targeting flowering, the most drought sensitive phase, and phase 3 
(dekads 9-14) addressing pod formation to maturity. 
The triggers and exits were calculated by approximating water requirements according to (CRMG 
2005), with the triggers set to 60, 160, and 100 mm totals for phases 1-3 respectively and 30, 30, and 20 
mm for exits. The sowing condition was calculated using the definition from (CRMG 2005) and set to 
25mm. The contract price was 10% of maximum liability. 
We began the contract improvement process with the WRSI model parameters, phase timing, sowing 
window, sowing trigger, triggers and exits from the CRMG draft contract but with the updated phase 
payout formula illustrated in Figure 3.2. We analyzed the performance of the contract against the 
weighted WRSI based loss index, with a target of obtaining a contract with a pseudo price rate of ap-
proximately 7%. 
With the original triggers but the updated payout function, the contract had a high pseudo price of 
12%, a low correlation to the weighted WRSI based loss of 34%, and a low payout rate of 16%, with 
71% of the payouts occurring in the worst ¼ years of the loss index. Evaluated using historical yield 
based losses, the correlation was high, at 61%, with 50% of the payouts in the worst ¼ years. 
We applied the optimizer directly to this contract, yielding triggers of 34, 161, and 99. Note that the 
optimizer did not substantially modify the second and third phases of the contract but instead improved 




was able to reduce the pseudo price to 8.5%, which was slightly above our 7% target. The correlation 
to the weighted WRSI based loss increased to 44%, with a low 11% pay rate and all of the payouts 
occurring during the worst ¼ years of the loss simulation. In essence, the way that the optimizer 
improved performance was to target the largest payment to the largest loss, and reduce the other 
payments. The correlation with the historical yield-based loss index changed to 53% with 50% of the 
payouts in the worst ¼ losses. 
In order to understand how to move from this draft contract to an improved contract for the clients, 
additional stakeholder interaction was important. The key issues were to identify if the payouts would 
have been compatible with the drought stresses that the producers were concerned about and if the 
strategy of having few payouts that were highly targeted to the worst years of the simulation was one 
that the producers would find useful. 
In addition to our discussions in farmer focus groups and other stakeholders, we presented draft 
contracts to ICRISAT experts in the Chitedze who had worked on the development of the variety. 
Discussions centered on the contracts allowed the experts to explicitly respond to contract strengths 
and weaknesses, providing an additional interaction focus beyond initial input based only on agro-
nomic features of the crop.
In cooperative design meetings with farmers using the spreadsheet design tool described in Refer-
ence Section 10, several potential avenues for contract improvement were revealed. First, following 
an initial presentation of the phase payout formula used in 2005 (and illustrated in Figure 3.1), the 
farmers asked that a new phase payout function be used, sketching with their fingers on a printout of 
the spreadsheet design tool, and saying that the new function would better reflect the drought stresses 
they faced. The payout function they sketched was the updated function shown in Figure 3.2 that we 
had been planning to implement. Thus, the farmers illustrated their support for the updated function 
before having seen it. 
The farmers said that they preferred more frequent payouts, and that although the crop had higher 
vulnerability in the middle of the season, dry spells were rare during that part of the season and 
they were more concerned about the more frequent dry spells that occurred later in the season. We 
discussed how to balance the coverage between parts of the season since it was not possible to cover 
both early and late season risks fully with an affordable premium. The resulting design choice was to 
include a large deductible, catastrophe oriented coverage in the first two phases, with little coverage 
for most years, but full payouts for very dry years combined with a lower deductible coverage for the 
third phase, with frequent, but smaller payouts. 
Following these discussions, as well as design discussions with agronomic experts, we shifted the 
phase timing slightly, moving the border between phases two and three so that phase two ended 
earlier by two dekads, with those two dekads moved to phase three. Thus, the new timing was phase 1 
(dekads 1-3), phase 2 (dekads 4-6), and phase 3 (dekads 7-14). This had the benefit of shifting some 
of the risk from the last part of the more sensitive middle phase into the last phase where we intended 
to target more coverage.
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We ran the optimizer with these phases, and an initial guess that was based on the design strategy of 
a high deductible in the first phases and a low deductible in the final phase. A variety of initial guesses 
were explored. For this illustration we look at the example of running the optimizer with an initial guess 
of 40, 40, and 100 for the triggers, which yields a tuned contract with triggers of 34, 39, and 210. In this 
contract, the majority of the payments occur during the last phase, the correlation against the WRSI 
based loss is 57%, 100% of the payouts occurred in the ¼ worst losses of the index, and the pseudo price 
was 7%. The payout frequency was 17% which fell outside of the stakeholders’ desired range of 20 to 
25%. The correlations with historical yield based losses did not raise any alarms, at 53% correlations and 
33% of the payouts in the worst ¼ years. Thus, a different and improved local optimum was uncovered 
by testing the alternative risk protection strategy developed with stakeholders. 
Following the computer tuning, we manually adjusted the triggers to increase the payout rate slightly 
and to round off the trigger levels to multiples of 5. This yielded the final contract that was implement-
ed in 2006 with triggers of 35, 35, and 220, a payout rate of 20%, an acceptable pseudo price of 7.6%, a 
correlation with the WRSI based loss of 0.55 and 78% of the payouts occurring in the worst ¼ years of 
the loss simulation. The majority of the historical burn payouts were due to the last phase. This contract 
also performed well against the historical yield based losses, with a correlation of 0.66 and 50% of the 
payouts in the worst ¼ years. For maize in Chitedze, sowing triggers didn’t need tuning because failed 
sowing events were extremely rare, not occurring at all in the historical record. 
Although this contract meets its design criteria quite well, it is likely that it could be further improved 
in the future through additional analysis supported by continued interaction with stakeholders and 
experts as they gain experience with the insurance product. It is important to build local capacity to 
allow the continual adaptation and improvement of contracts. For additional activities likely to yield 
improvements in contracts, refer to the section on design issues that must be addressed in the future.
2. Overview of changes from original design
The original contracts were directly determined using the WRSI model based calculations presented 
in (CRMG 2005) with insurance contract parameters phrased in terms of WRSI features. Although 
original contracts were verified through analysis of historical rainfall and correlations with observed 
yields and WRSI simulations, design responses in the original contracts were not as transparent as they 
could have been. A systematic parameter update process was not explicit in the original design process. 
Since contract parameters were phrased directly in terms of WRSI model parameters, climate or data 
driven updates of model parameters were awkward. 
Much of the protection that an insurance contract provides is climate driven, not crop vulnerability 
driven. In fact, if a farmer is using a crop that is well suited for the local climate, the crop will be se-
lected so that its periods of drought vulnerability coincide precisely with the times in the season that are 
likely to be wet. Likewise, the crop will be selected in order to have low water stress vulnerability during 
the parts of the season that are typically dry. Therefore drought vulnerability is a balance between the 
particular strengths of the crop and the water stress challenges presented by the local climate and a 
drought protection contract must explicitly address this balance in its design. In addition, since no 
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model (including WRSI) would be expected to have perfect accuracy in predicting crop water stress, it 
is important to allow for imperfect model precision in the design process instead of providing an inflex-
ible link between model parameters and final insurance products. 
In addition to the challenge of accurately reflecting drought stress, insurance contracts embody con-
straints that are not embodied in crop models or rainfall and yield data. An insurance contract must 
be functional as a financial product. This is particularly true for microfinance products, which must be 
highly cost effective and straightforward to transact, providing a very useful product for the client for 
a low premium. A fundamental feature of index insurance is that there are many losses that it does 
not cover. Therefore, the tuning process for index insurance contracts involves selecting what losses 
the index is able to most cost-effectively address at the expense of those losses that the index does not 
address well. Though it is possible to design a contract that addresses a wide range of losses with an 
unlimited premium and a high payout frequency, the need to create affordable and workable contracts 
requires making sacrifices in coverage in order to target the index to losses it handles most efficiently. 
Because these products offer partial coverage (as opposed to a traditional comprehensive insurance 
product) at affordable rates, the design process must address the problem of how to target the parts 
of potential losses that can be insured most cost effectively given price and other product constraints. 
Insurance products cannot be too expensive. Since comprehensive coverage is typically prohibitively 
expensive in the microfinance context, contract design is not a question of how to cover all the risk, but 
instead how to budget a farmer’s premium in order to most effectively address as much risk as possible 
in the most useful way for the farmer. Insurance cannot pay out each year while a policy that pays out 
with only a 5% probability may not be a useful risk management tool for a farmer. Deductibles and 
levels of risk retained by the farmer must be adjusted to arrive at a product that has an implementable 
payout frequency. Trade-offs must be made between deductibles for losses from potential drought stress 
from different parts of the season. It is therefore important to have a process that can systematically and 
explicitly address these issues in contract design.
Since the design process for the original contracts did not provide explicit mechanisms for systematic 
inclusion of climate features, uncertainty levels for drought stress, or economic factors and insurance 
product constraints, we extended the design process to more formally address these issues, described 
more fully in the following sections.
3. Changes in phase payout function
We simplified the formula for payouts based on phase rainfall totals in order to increase the transpar-
ency and robustness of the product. Figure 3.1 depicts the structure of the 2005 formula. Phase rainfall 
totals above a particular level (the trigger), warrant no payout. If the rainfall total is below the trigger, 
but above the exit, payments increase from zero linearly, with a slope determined by the “ticks” specified 
for that phase of the contract. In the 2005 contracts, these ticks were determined directly from WRSI 
parameters, and triggers were selected as a particular level of loss as represented by the WRSI calculated 
water demands. If the rainfall total was below the exit (which was selected to represent 50% of WRSI 
determined demand), the maximum payout is awarded. Therefore a 1 mm difference in rainfall totals 
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can change payments by orders of magnitudes. 
This was a critical issue for the particular contracts 
implemented in 2005, because the 50% WRSI level 
extremely unlikely in those locations. Although 50% 
WRSI as criteria has been used as an approximation 
for large scale crop failures, it is only an approxima-
tion at best.
 
The 50% WRSI criterion is only a rough distinc-
tion useful for rough categorization of stress levels 
and does not reflect agronomic processes leading to 
sudden change from a stressed crop to a complete 
failure. This feature was not evident in any of our 
process based crop simulation analysis. In addition, 
in our initial focus group meeting with farmers for 
which we discussed a draft version of the contract 
communication tool based on the 2005 contracts, 
the first feedback that farmers provided was that 
they felt the discontinuity at 50% WRSI did not reflect their crops’ water stress characteristics.
Because this formula leads to payouts that might be highly contentious if rainfall is near the exit, a 
dramatic discontinuity between potential maximum payout and the majority of payouts, and is only an 
approximate reflection of total failure level, the 2006 contracts eliminate this discontinuity. 
In the formula for a 2006 phase payout is a piecewise linear function with no payouts if the sum is 
above the trigger, a maximum payout if the sum is below the exit, with a linear payment function 
ranging from no payout to full payout between the trigger and exit. This function (presented earlier and 
illustrated in Figure 3.2) is below. 
Payout= (1 – (Rainfall Sum – Exit) / (Trigger – Exit)) Max Payout
As discussed earlier, since agronomic features of 
the crop are but one component of the risk that 
the insurance targets, the derivation of triggers and 
exits directly from the WRSI model is no longer 
pursued, particularly since the lower trigger of 50% 
WRSI does not accurately reflect full crop loss. 
Although individual plants can die from water 
stress, it is unlikely that all of the plants in a plot 
will die at the same time. Instead, the failure will 
be for an increasing fraction of plants across the 
plot as drought levels increase. The critical point at 
which the harvests are a failure is determined by 
the yield level at which it is not worth the farmer’s 
labor to harvest the weak yields. Failure is a com-
Figure 3.1 2005 phase payout function
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Figure 4.1 DSSAT crop yields and dekadal and daily WRSI based crop yields using 
average and 4-stage Ky values for Chitedze groundnut crop.
plex process, involving subtle agronomic features as well as economic characteristics of the particular 
farm family. 
The exit is not easily determined scientifically to coincide with complete loss, but functions better when 
interpreted in terms of a parameter to use to target insurance coverage as cost effectively as possible. 
Thus, it is recommended that the triggers and exits be determined through the design process described 
in this document that begins with agronomic features, but where the final contract parameters represent 
a combination of agronomic features, climate, and economic constraints instead of only agronomic 
parameters.
. Discussion of crop stress methodology 
The role of a water stress model differs according to its application. A model that effectively quantifies 
and targets relative water stress events may have low skill at forecasting absolute yield levels, or quanti-
fying the absolute level of risk a producer faces. In understanding the recommendations and comments 
we make, it is important to understand that the task at hand in designing the index insurance is not to 
accurately predict yield levels for a particular farmer, but instead to identify the most important water 
stress mechanisms for the community of farmers in the region surrounding a met station.
A WRSI algorithm that was based on dekadal precipitation sums and a constant water stress param-
eter was used to design the 2005 contracts for Malawi groundnuts. The algorithm used is described in 
(Commodity Risk Management Group 2006). In order to gauge the performance of the WRSI stress 
calculations, we have performed a battery of comparisons for groundnuts and maize in Malawi at the 
stations for which sufficient data existed to perform comparisons. We considered alternate WRSI 
specifications and process based 
agronomic modeling to under-
stand what the most appropriate 
specification and roles are for the 
modeling tools. 
We considered two types of 
WRSI formulation specification 
choices in terms of their implica-
tions for contract design. The first 
was the use of daily rainfall as 
opposed to ten day dekadal totals 
to drive the model. The second 
was the inclusion of a seasonally 
varying yield stress parameter as 
opposed to one that is constant 
over the season. In addition, 
we investigated the utility of a 
process based crop model (this 
model is described in Appendix 
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5) in the context of contract design, and as a frame of reference for discussion of WRSI alternatives. 
The unweighted WRSI based specification only models stress based on the water processing features of 
the plant and soil in response to climate. For a given leaf area and root depth, the unweighted WRSI 
based model will yield identical stress for a plant facing the same amount of available water during a 
time when the plant is particularly vulnerable to stress and when the plant does not require any water. 
This is particularly important for a crop such as maize, for which there are particular parts of the growth 
cycle when water stress has much higher impacts on the plant. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates alternate modeling specifications for water stress calculations of groundnut crops 
in Chitedze. WRSI based Crop Production Index (CPI) results are shown for daily and dekadal speci-
fications with both seasonally varying and constant crop stress parameters (Ky). The WRSI based CPI 
ranges from 1000 indicating no stress and 0 complete water stress. Also included is a DSSAT process 
based yield simulation, which is presented in terms of kg/ha and normalized to have maximum yields of 
10,000 kg/ha. The analyses are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Dekadal summation of rainfall can reduce the stress represented in the model. In a dekadal summation, 
having the same amount of rainfall evenly spread over ten days is equivalent to having no rainfall for 
nine days and the last day with all of the rainfall for the period. Because of this averaging, we can see 
that in this case the dekadal calculated indexes under-represent yield stresses, with the indexes based on 
daily rainfall reflecting more stress with more variation. Therefore we recommend that if daily rainfall is 
available, it be used in the WRSI calculations. 
Comparing the non-varying Ky results to the Ky parameters that vary by crop growth stage, we can 
see that drought stress in this example is less when the varying Ky is applied. It is likely that this is 
because the varieties have been well selected for the local climate, i.e. that the crops are more resistant 
to drought stress during the parts of the season that are typically dry. In order to capture the risk im-
pacts of variety choice in the index design, we recommend that an index based on seasonally varying 
Ky be used for contract development. In terms of index design, there is some similarity between all of 
the WRSI based indexes, with most of the worst years in any WRSI based index being evident in the 
alternate specifications. The primary difference is the relative magnitude of alternate stress years.
For completeness, additional simulation results for the different stations and crops are presented with-
out discussion in Appendix 9.
Table 4.1 Statistical comparison of DSSAT crop yields and dekadal and daily WRSI based crop yields using average Ky 
and 4-stage Ky values for Chitedze groundnut crop.
DSSAT Crop Yield Dekadal CPI (av Ky) Dekadal CPI (4 Kys) Daily CPI (av Ky) Daily CPI (4 Kys)
Min 0 690 777 650 735
Max 6285 1000 1000 1000 1000
Average 4270 923 947 872 911
STDEV 1375 79.2 58.0 78.0 58.1
CV 0.32 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
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The DSSAT yield simulation 
provides a different picture, with 
much more variation and many 
differences in which years appear 
to be severe. Process based 
simulation models are highly 
sensitive to parameter assump-
tions and require a great deal 
of data. Assumptions can have 
dramatic impacts on simulation 
results. Many of these important 
assumptions are not known for 
the population or may need to 
be specific to each farmer (such 
as soil nutrient levels). Without 
extensive data for calibration, it 
is difficult to know if a process 
based model is representing a 
representative farmer or a very particular hypothetical situation. 
Since index insurance is awarded using a regional met station using a single contract for a population 
of farmers, index insurance is a tool best suited to target the covariate risk faced by a population of 
farmers. Other strategies are typically coupled with index insurance to target the idiosyncratic risks. 
These individually tailored risk management tools include such as crop diversification, risk reducing 
production practices, or pooling farmers and plots. In Malawi, farmers are pooled into groups in order 
to spread idiosyncratic risk. Another example is in Tanzania, where which farmers reported managing 
multiple plots at different elevations in order to reduce risk.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the covariate and idio-
syncratic variability in yields with historical 
yield data at the EPA (sub district) level for 
groundnuts in the Chitedze/Lilongwe area. In 
this figure, one can see that there is covariate risk 
that impacts all of the sub-regions with EPA 
specific differences in yield. Table 4.2 reports 
the correlations between these EPAs, showing 
that although the covariate risk is relatively high 
for most regions, e.g. 1992, there is a substantial 
amount of idiosyncratic risk that must be ad-
dressed through other risk management tools.
 
Table 4.3 reports the correlations between WRSI 
based production indices, DSSAT simulation 
runs, and historical yields. WRSI based indices 

























Table 4.2 Correlations between individual EPA historical 
groundnut yields and average historical groundnut yields for the 
Chitedze area.












constantly have higher correlations with historical yields than the DSSAT runs. The correlation be-
tween DSSAT and WRSI varies by location and crop. It is possible that the DSSAT results are cali-
brated to a very specific and idiosyncratic situation. Therefore, we recommend that WRSI based stress 
indices be used to target the covariate risk as the benchmark index for contract design and that process 
based models be used (when available) to test the robustness of contracts as well as to help answer 
specific questions about crop behavior.
In summary, the analyses and comparisons lead us to recommend that contract design be based on a 
WRSI based drought stress benchmark and that the WRSI stress modeling always be supplemented 
with alternate information sources for contract validation. We recommend that daily rainfall data be 
utilized in the WRSI model so that the implications of variation within a ten day period not be masked 
in the contract design process. We also recommend that a time-varying yield stress parameter be uti-
lized, since critical water stress features are not addressed by WRSI without this parameter. We do not 
recommend that more detailed process based models, such as DSSAT be used as the design benchmark. 
Instead, we recommend these models be used (when available) to perform specific analyses to provide 
insight into particular design questions. The process based models not only requires a lot of data, but 
tend to be very sensitive to the calibration assumptions, leading to dramatic changes in simulated stress 
for small changes in model parameters that are not well measured, or that vary over the population of 
growers. Because contracts must be a compromise that addresses a wide range of farmers with differ-
ent characteristics within a region, it is worthwhile to have a model that reflects the shared response 
to drought as opposed to the idiosyncratic parameters of a particular grower. When available, DSSAT 
models are likely to be useful in testing the effectiveness of a WRSI based contract to uncover drought 
stress features that have been missed by the WRSI model. 
The WRSI water stress model is best interpreted in the contract design as a precipitation accounting 
system that is adjusted to represent the particular water stress characteristics of a particular variety. Its 
outputs are a direct representation of the assumptions that are used in the model. It is a well known 
framework, with intuitive parameters that can be transparently adjusted to reflect observed crop 
behavior. 
Thus, it is well suited to contract design because it can be tuned and adjusted to most accurately repre-
sent characteristics of a particular variety in a given locality. Agricultural experts can typically provide 
Table 4.3 Correlations between WRSI and DSSAT simulated yields and historical yields for groundnut and maize crops. 
Station Crop DSSAT/ hist. yields WRSI/hist. yields DSSAT/WRSI
Lilongwe
groundnut 0.13 0.31 0.54
maize 0.17 0.38 0.39
Kasungu
groundnut -0.01 0.39 -0.04
maize 0.37 0.77 0.04
Nkhotakota
groundnut 0.10 0.35 0.54
maize -0.22 -0.06 0.46
Chitedze
groundnut 0.30 0.52 0.57
maize 0.01 0.24 0.28
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input to enable the model to be tuned appropriately for a local crop. In addition, a model that is incor-
rectly calibrated is often easily recognized by local experts. The calendar for growth phases is explicitly 
assumed, which allows for verification with local experts as well as farmers. When discrepancies are 
observed, through discussions with agronomists or farmers, it is relatively straightforward to adjust the 
parameters to accurately reflect the timing of local varieties and techniques. 
The information supplied by farmers is of particular importance in determining an accurate timing 
of the season: when a farmer sows and when the crop is in each stage of growth. WRSI assumes the 
timing of the season; therefore, in the case of an incorrect assumption, the insurance no longer serves 
its purpose, since its payouts would no longer correspond to true times of crop loss. For this reason, it is 
best to use a suite of tools in order to mobilize all the information available to ensure a well-designed 
contract. We used the following questions in discussions with farmers to verify and adjust WRSI 
parameters and contracts. The questions below are tailored to maize. An extended questionnaire is 
included in Appendix 7.
• What are the best years and the worst years for maize production that you can 
remember?
• What made these years the best and worst years? What were the specific events that 
caused yield to be good or bad?
• Does the dynamic sowing period reflect your sowing practices? i.e. do you wait for 
the first rains to sow?
• How do you judge when rain is sufficient for planting?
• What do you do if rains are insufficient for planting? Plant a different crop vs plant 
anyway etc?
• Are sowing and tasseling the two times when you feel that your crops are most 
vulnerable to drought?
• If there is a different part of the growing season in which your crops have been vul-
nerable to drought, what is this part, what month(s) does it occur, and in what years 
has it been a problem?
• In which years did you have yield problems because of drought, and for each year, 
what was the reason for the problem (e.g. dry sowing/weak start of rains or drought 
during the filling phase)?
• Do the historical payouts from the contract we are discussing match the years in 
which you would have expected a payout?
. loss proxy
In developing a loss indicator, it is important to recognize that insurance is a product that does not 
provide payments in most years. Therefore, the optimization task is not to design a policy that has 
high protection against all production changes, but instead to provide a contract that is well designed 
to efficiently address the more substantial losses. Insurance requires a deductible. That is, until a loss 
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becomes substantial, there is no payout. Insurance is not a product that should “protect” a farmer from 
reductions to the maximum possible yield, and in fact must have no payment in the majority of years. 
It is important to acknowledge this feature in the optimization and evaluation of insurance. Basis risk 
is not simply the correlation with yields--it is the protection against losses of the size it is intended to 
protect against If the insurance is evaluated and designed using data on minor yield fluctuations in good 
years (which are by definition, the majority of years), but constrained to provide zero payouts in those 
years, it will falsely appear to have low correlations and will not be tuned to effectively cover the losses it 
is intended to cover. 
In order to have an optimization criterion that leads to more effective insurance products, a proxy for 
losses is developed from the yield index. First, yield indicator data are multiplied by an approximate 
factor to convert them into the rough order of magnitude of monetary units. The exact magnitude of 
this factor is not critical, since the contract being developed is scale independent.2 A rough bench-
mark level is selected for the level of yields below which a loss is indicated. Any yield level above this 
benchmark is not considered in the insurance design. The precise level of this benchmark is not critical; 
its main purpose is to shift the optimization and evaluation of contracts to losses, as opposed to good 
years. For transparency, the designs used in this project utilized the mean as the loss benchmark. This 
is a trade-off between how much yield information to offer to the optimization and evaluation process 
verses how much of the unhelpful information related to good years to remove from the process. The 
loss proxy is zero for all data points that are above the benchmark, and it is the benchmark less mul-
tiplied yield indicator data for points below the benchmark, leading to a loss proxy that is zero for all 
good years, and a positive loss value for years below the benchmark.
. Optimization 
The optimization algorithm adjusts the triggers of the contract to achieve the lowest variance in the 
simulated difference of payouts and losses for a given insurance price constraint. Since it is only able 
to identify local optima, the optimizer may only serve as a local tuner. It is also important to note that 
this optimization process does not weigh all of the potentially important factors in contract design, 
and should only be used as a part of contract design. After applying the optimizer to contract design 
proposals, we then evaluate the tuned contracts against historical data and other data and models that 
are available. Once we have developed a satisfactory contract, we round the contract’s triggers to whole 
numbers in order to maintain simplicity of contract presentation. The rounding process has negligible 
impact on contract performance, but results in contracts that may be easier to communicate. Contracts 
that are cast in terms of a high level of precision could mislead people to thinking the models were 
more precise than they are.
The R software is free and can be downloaded from the http://cran.r-project.org/. The optimization 
method used in our code is an implementation of the standard Nelder and Mead (1965) algorithm. This 
2In some cases this factor can be used as one tool to adjust the weighting of the optimization function between a few large 
payouts and many small payouts. A larger factor will put more weight on fewer payouts and a smaller factor will put opti-
mization weight on more, smaller payouts. This will only work in particular cases, as in general the optimization is highly 
insensitive to the scaling factor. 
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method uses only function values and is robust, working reasonably well for non-differentiable func-
tions (http://cran.r-project.org/doc/manuals/fullrefman.pdf, p1123). This algorithm converged much 
more reliably than alternatives, including simulated annealing procedures.
 
In the contract analysis and optimization a “pseudo price” formula was utilized. It was in no way 
intended to be official, as the final price of contracts should be negotiated by the appropriate players. 
The pseudo price formula was chosen to offer a robust, standard, and transparent representation of the 
trade-offs in risk exposure to the insurance provider, to serve as a predictable gauge to compare the 
relative performance of similar contracts. Our calculation of pseudo price is the ratio of premium to the 
maximum liability, where premium is calculated as 
Average payout + Loading * (Value at Risk- average payout).
In our analysis, we used a Value at Risk that is the 99th percentile as calculated by the R software and a 
loading of 6%. Since the distribution is likely fat tailed because there are never enough observations to 
properly determine the 99th percentile, this value may be biased. However, it still represents a measure 
of the risk in the distribution and functions as a simple and transparent index that allows the optimizer 
to select between contract possibilities. The loading of 6% for the Value at Risk typically differs from 
final pricing and is chosen by the insurer given his portfolio and required return on VaR. A value of 
6% is chosen simply to indicate some element of risk margin. Price changes should only have a subtle 
effect, if any, on the contract evaluation process so long as the final insurance pricing is qualitatively 
similar. In Appendix 2, we provide additional description of the pseudo-pricing calculation and describe 
alternative pricing functions that were explored in the contract design process but not pursued for final 
contract design. 
When official pricing is performed, it is possible that some of the contracts are inexpensive enough that 
it would be worthwhile to increase the price in order to offer an increased level of coverage. In these 
instances, the most likely route to increased coverage is through increasing exits, which would lead to 
increased payouts without impacting the timing or frequency of payouts. In cases where a particular 
vulnerability needs to be addressed, it may be worthwhile to increase some triggers, while decreasing 
others in order to maintain a reasonable number of payouts. 
The pseudo price was calculated using historical rainfall for the contract design algorithm. This `his-
torical-burn’ analysis is transparent and particularly useful for identifying and addressing mismatches 
between the contract payouts and years for which payments would have been useful. However, it is only 
part of the analysis important for actual pricing of the contracts. Since historical data is typically only 
available for approximately forty years or so, it is likely that there are many events that would be impor-
tant for pricing that are not well represented in historical burn payouts (such as 99th percentile events). 
In addition, prices could be dramatically and artificially impacted by a small change in a contract 
parameter (such as a sowing condition). If a 1mm decrease in a sowing condition would eliminate a no-
sow condition in the historical data, a historical burn price fall dramatically. This dramatic price change 
would not accurately reflect the price change due to change in the probability of a no sow event in 
future years due to the 1mm contract change. Therefore it is important to use Monte Carlo techniques 
to properly characterize rainfall probabilities for final pricing. Monte Carlo pricing would smoothly 
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change contract prices as the distance between the no-sow condition and the historical events. For the 
future, it would be worthwhile to utilize Monte Carlo techniques in contract design (to supplement the 
historical burn analysis). Note that some Monte Carlo analysis and aspects of portfolio pricing was used 
by the parties who were involved in the final pricing of 2006 contracts. 
. Index Insurance Complexity
One of the principal differences between an index product and a traditional loss based product is that 
index insurance is most fundamentally a hedge, not a comprehensive product. Index insurance acts to 
minimize one element of risk, but does not function as a comprehensive product and does not cover all 
losses. This can best be communicated to potential buyers by keeping contracts as simple as possible, so 
that the farmer easily understands the details of the contract and can accurately gauge his or her own 
basis risk. It is critical that the farmer is able to adjust her risk management activities around the limita-
tions and capabilities of the insurance. If the index is too complex, the client will not be able to use it 
as an effective part of the risk management tool kit, but may end up facing risks that are not addressed 
through other means, and may not even be anticipated.
A complex contract carries with it the concern that a client may misinterpret the contract as a compre-
hensive product that covers all losses. Therefore, increased complexity should only be justified through 
a demonstration of vastly improved performance of the contract. When a complex contract is designed, 
we should always evaluate if a similar quality of coverage could be maintained through a simplified 
and more transparent strategy. We should also remember that the more complex contract may provide 
effective protection against modeled losses but be difficult to adjust to effectively protect against actual 
losses, which may only be truly known by the farmer.
In traditional loss-based insurance, the insurance is inherently linked with losses by the adjustor. In 
designing index insurance, the designer assumes the task of linking the insurance to the loss. To do this 
the designer must find the most cost effective way to cover as much loss as possible, understanding that 
the contract will never serve as a method of addressing all losses. This is a crucial point to emphasize in 
teaching contract design to insurance company audiences, since most companies are not used to having 
to connect insurance to losses and many may lack the expertise necessary to do so. 
The complexity of the contract is one of the trade-offs that an index insurance designer must weigh. 
For the current project, a three phase contract is used to model drought stress. This has the advantages 
of being transparent to clients and being adaptable to address drought stress features that sophisticated 
models may not capture with the disadvantage of perhaps being less correlated with loss than a more 
complex index. We use the three phase index to approximate the drought stress exhibited in the WRSI 
model, and then adjust it to meet client demands and insurance practicality. It is interesting to consider 
how the three phase contract compares to the WRSI model itself in contract performance. 
Of course, direct comparison against the WRSI contract is unfair, since the three phase contract must 
meet a price constraint and a constraint on payout frequencies. In order to illustrate the trade-off 
involved in using the three phase contract, we adapted the WRSI loss index used as the benchmark in 
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contract design into an alternative rainfall insurance index. In order to meet payment frequency con-
straints, a ‘deductible’ level was determined for the WRSI loss index. For any loss below the deductible, 
the payment function is equal to zero. To address the price constraints a coefficient was determined that 
would, when multiplied by the non-zero WRSI loss index values, lead to a premium equal to that of the 
three phase contract. The WRSI based index payment for each year would therefore be the non-zero 
loss index values multiplied by the scaling coefficient.
Table 7.1 compares the three phase contract to the WRSI based index payment using the WRSI loss 
index as the loss benchmark. Since the WRSI payments are merely a truncated and scaled version of 
the loss measure, this table is not a true comparison of the quality of coverage using the WRSI based 
payouts verses the three phase payouts, but instead illustrates coverage losses that are entirely due to 
price and frequency as well as the coverage losses when using the three phase approximation to cover 
the WRSI loss. Note that the percentage of payouts in the worst 1/4 of years is not reported for the 
WRSI based payouts since they are identical to the WRSI loss in this measure.
One can see by looking at the WRSI based payments that the price and frequency constraints typically 
lead to a twenty to 30% loss in correlation while the three phase contracts typically lead to an additional 
loss in correlation of approximately 0.2 to 0.3. In addition, the payments of the three phase contracts are 
not entirely targeted to the worst losses, ranging from about 30% of the payments in the worst quarter 
of the years to almost 80%. 
In observing the table, it is important to keep in mind that the contracts actually implemented were 
adjusted from initial contracts that were more closely correlated with the WRSI based loss because of 
stakeholder requests. For example, stakeholders requested payments be shifted strategically to specific 
parts of the season for which the WRSI model did not show the greatest vulnerabilities. These changes 
could have been driven by the alternate risk management tools available to the farmers. For example 
since the farmers grow multiple crops, it may be that risks during parts of the season are most cost 
effectively covered by revenues from an alternate crop, leaving the role of insurance for the gap between 
the risk handling in crop mix and the risks faced by the farmer. 
Table 7.1 Correlations of 3 phase and WRSI based contracts to WRSI simulated losses
 3 phase  WRSI Based
Station Crop Correlation % pay in 1/4 Correlation % pay in 1/4
Lilongwe Groundnut 0.46 58.3 0.72 91.7
maize 0.59 58.3 0.77 91.7
Chitedze Groundnut 0.55 77.8 0.76 100
maize 0.42 30.0 0.77 100
Kasungu Groundnut 0.39 60.0 0.68 100
maize 0.41 83.3 0.64 100
Nkhotakota Groundnut 0.41 36.4 0.81 100
maize 0.69 72.7 0.83 100
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3Recall that it is important to take conclusions based on historical yield data with caution, since the time series are typically 
much shorter than what would be necessary for statistical identification, they represent averages as opposed to individual 
farmers, the data is often in error, and the varieties, inputs, and practices often are different than for the crop being protected.
They also could have been driven by inaccuracies in the WRSI model when compared to farmer pro-
duction. Therefore, although the use of the more complex WRSI model, which cannot be calculated di-
rectly by the farmers, might lead to improved coverage, it might also lead to a less appropriate product. 
 
This is highlighted in Table 7.2, which compares the three phase contract payouts to our constructed 
WRSI based payouts in terms of protection against historical losses. Note that for some indexes there 
were no payouts during the historical data series, since the payout frequency is low and the historical 
time series are relatively short. Thus comparisons cannot be made for crops in these locations (and 
results are listed as NA in the tables).3 Comparing the performance of the two contracts, it is not clear 
which consistently performs better against historical loss data. 
Therefore, the choice of the complexity of an index depends heavily on the feedback received from 
stakeholders and the role of the index insurance product. Often, simple contracts based on phases are 
useful for retail to farmers, allowing a transparent contract and simple adaptation based on farmer 
feedback. Likewise, model based indexes have been applied more often when the client is a government 
or NGO (for example for the national famine relief programs) in which the client can run the index 
model to ensure the product provides cost effective risk protection and in which the model represents 
most of the information that the clients have available about losses. Of course, these strategies depend 
on the demands of stakeholders in each particular situation. The trade-off between complexity and 
transparency should be weighed for each application.
. Portfolio pricing
Index contracts and reinsurance could be designed to take advantage of regional and global climate 
features, since large scale climate processes typically lead to negatively correlated seasonal rainfall 
between regions. For example, an ENSO state that is associated with higher probabilities of drought in 
Table 7.2 Correlations of 3 phase and WRSI based contracts to historical losses
 3 phase  WRSI Based
Station Crop Correlation % pay in 1/4 Correlation % Pay in 1/4
Lilongwe Groundnut 0.15 25 0.36 66.7
maize 0.55 100 0.78 50
Chitedze Groundnut 0.66 50 0.67 66.7
maize 0.53 100 NA NA
Kasungu Groundnut 0.23 25 0.39 25
maize NA NA 0.45 0
Nkhotakota Groundnut 0.59 40 0.31 33.3
maize -0.38 0 -0.34 0
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Table 8.1 Table of Spearman Rank 
Correlations between timing of 

























Southern Africa is correlated with 
ample rainfall in the Greater Horn 
of Africa. On smaller scales, year to 
year climate processes often lead to 
rainfall occurring on alternate sides 
of a mountain range. Even when 
the location of rainfall cannot be 
predicted, an understanding of 
the negative correlations between 
regions could be used to reduce 
costs. We illustrate this potential 
using existing contracts for maize 
in Malawi.
 
Malawi’s rainfall is largely influ-
enced by variations in altitude and 
proximity to Lake Malawi, varying 
from 500 mm in low lying areas 
to over 2,000 mm in the highlands and areas close to the lake’s shore (Munthali 2003). Ninety-five 
percent of Malawi’s annual rainfall occurs during one distinct rainy season lasting from November to 
April (Malawi Department of Meteorological Services 2007). The Inter Tropical Convergence Zone 
(ITZ), Congo Air Boundary, Semi-permanent anti-cyclones, east-
erly waves, and tropical cyclones all influence rainfall patterns in the 
country.
Research carried out by G.K. Munthali et al. found that it is rare for 
drought to strike all three regions of Malawi simultaneously. In 55 
years, drought was only found to affect all three areas of the country 
on two occasions. Munthali also found localized mild drought to be 
more frequent in Karonga, in the north, and Salima, in the central 
region, than the other regions studied. Both Karonga and Salima are located near the shore of Lake 
Malawi, illustrating the influence of the lake on rainfall patterns (Munthali 2003).
The rainfall distribution patterns across Malawi may have 
potential to lower the overall cost of the index insurance. 
For example, if a weather station in the north is measuring a 
rainfall deficit, while a weather station in the south measures 
normal rainfall, then a single insurance company covering 
farmers in both locations may be able to use the differences 
in rainfall to decrease the total risk they are covering at any 
given time. This reduction of risk can allow for a reduction in premiums, as less money is needed to 
cover total risk. An additional source of diversification is that different sowing timing and crop varieties 
may be used in different regions, which could lead to vulnerabilities in different times of the season. 
Thus, the same dry spell may severely impact a region in which maize is in the filling growth phase but 







have no effect on yields in a region for 
which maze is in the maturation and 
drying stages.
The stations for which the index 
insurance contracts are currently 
written are all in the central part of 
the country, making it likely that 
there are not large variations in 
rainfall patterns. However, as it is 
difficult to precisely determine the 
boundary between northern and 
southern Malawi rainfall trends, 
rainfall patterns between some of the 
four stations may be great enough 
that premium reduction is possible. 
To illustrate the potential for strategic 
selection of negatively correlated sites 
to reduce insurance costs, we present 
the example of maize payouts in Malawi, focusing on the stations with negatively correlated payouts.
 
Visual inspection of payouts at the 4 stations studied reveals that payouts rarely occurred at multiple 
stations for maize (see Figure 8.1). 
Two negative correlations are evident in maize payouts. The greatest of those was the correlation of 
-0.19 between Lilongwe and Nkhotakota maize payouts. The other negative correlation was -0.12 
between Chitedze and Nkhotakota. See Table 8.1.
We apply a simplistic pseudo pricing of maize contracts to illustrate the potential for portfolio pric-
ing. In the tables below, the prices are presented for individual stations and different set portfolios of 
stations. The insurance price is presented both through the average of prices, ignoring portfolio effects 
(referred to as avg in the table) and 
as the simultaneous pricing of the 
stations allowing for portfolio effects.
By the law of averages, including 
additional policies into the portfolio 
should decrease the risk faced by the 
insurer, allowing premium prices to 
decrease correspondingly. However, 
with index insurance, contracts for 
an individual crop at an individual 
station are perfectly correlated, so 
risk is only averaged down as addi-
Figure 8.2 Premium price of portfolio contract for Lilongwe and Nkhotakota 


























Table 8.3 maize pricing using averaging and portfolio methods, and percent 












tional crops and stations are included in the portfolio. Of course, if these contracts are somewhat cor-
related, the risk will be reduced by less than if they were uncorrelated, and if the contracts are negatively 
correlated, the risk reduction would be more substantial. This is illustrated in the price calculations, for 
which a portfolio including only Chitedze and Lilongwe, which have correlated payouts, reduces price 
by only about 3%, while the portfolio including Lilongwe and Nkhotakota, which have negatively cor-
related payouts, reduces prices by much more dramatic amounts. Likewise, it is evident that including 
a larger number of stations reduces risk more, as the portfolio including all stations has a substantially 
reduced price. 
It is possible to strategically design a portfolio in order to maximize risk reduction. To provide the 
simplest example possible, we illustrate through a portfolio including farmers at the Lilongwe and 
Nkhotakota stations, with a product priced using the standard deviation specification for the measure of 
risk (see Appendix XI).4 
Figure 8.2 illustrates the premium per farmer for different participation levels at the two stations. The 
lowest premium results from a contract where 58% of farmers were located in Lilongwe and 42% of 
farmers were stationed in Nkhotakota. It is likely that farmers might be offered less expensive contracts 
and insurers may face less risk if attention is paid to portfolio price effects when upscaling the program. 
It may be that insurance that is not feasible in a particular region when that region is considered for a 
stand alone policy may become workable, and perhaps even be beneficial for other regions, when it is 
considered as part of a portfolio. Future work concerning this feature of insurance design would there-
fore be worthwhile to pursue.
. Forecast and insurance
In order to illustrate the potential for forecast based insurance packages, we include a summary of 
preliminary research we are pursuing using internal IRI funding. Note that this work is preliminary 
and is likely to change as it develops. Additional background and details can be found in (International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 2007)
We use a hypothetical case based on the contract for maize in Kasungu, Malawi, as it provides a clear 
illustration of the potential for integrating forecasts and insurance. We use ENSO phase as a basic 
forecast in order to clearly illustrate the forecast and insurance problem. Of course, ENSO is merely a 
starting point, and forecasts with higher skill would be expected to have more dramatic impacts than 
our exploratory ENSO based analysis. ENSO is a useful starting point because it is commonly used, 
simple, transparent, requires few assumptions to apply, is a measured index (as opposed to a forecast 
model), and its potential impacts have been mentioned by each stakeholder group in the Malawi insur-
4We utilize the standard deviation for this example instead of the 99th percentile because issues related to small sample size 
prevent us from providing a clear and focused illustration. For actual contract portfolio design, risk metrics focusing on the 
tails of the distribution should be used.
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ance project. The rough consensus beliefs about ENSO among stakeholders is that El Niño years are 
more likely to be dry, and that La Nina years are more likely to be wet.
We consider the evidence for forecast based design resulting from a simple student’s t-test, acknowl-
edging that many of the assumptions that the test is based on may not necessarily hold (for example 
that draws are iid). Our intent is not to provide a definitive hypothesis test based on the t-test, but 
instead to discuss the evidence commonly available to a design expert.
We calculate insurance payouts if the 2006 maize insurance contract for Kasungu was applied to the 
historical rainfall data available during the period from 1962 to 2006. For the sake of illustration, we 
study a hypothetical implementation of the Malawi insurance contract for one acre of hybrid maize 
production using the prices, parameters, and constraints agreed to by the stakeholders.5 
We partition years into El Nino, La Nina, and Neutral based on the ENSO category in October (when 
contracts are signed)6. Table 9.1 presents a series of student’s t-tests of differences in payouts for years 
of differing ENSO states. Hypothesis testing is challenging given the small numbers of years available 
for analysis. ENSO impacts are subtle if not impossible to detect. All tests have p-values above the 10% 
level except for the test that La Nina years are less likely to have a payout than other years. The majority 
of p-values are in the 10-15% range, which would be unlikely to drive an insurance design expert to 
redesign the insurance product. 
We ask if these subtle detections of differences between phases can have non-subtle impacts on the 
insurance implementation. 
Although the student’s t-test has only subtle detections of differences in payouts by ENSO phase, the 
mean payout values are recognizably different (see Table 9.2) with average payouts in El Nino phases 
being substantially higher than average, and average payouts in La Nina years being much lower than 
average. If farmers were to strategically purchase insurance based on ENSO phase over the time period 
for which the observed rainfall patterns occurred, the farmers could have undermined the fiscal stability 
of the insurance system by not purchasing in La Nina years. 
Using the formulas applied in the 2006 implementation7, we calculate the ‘historical burn’8 insurance 
price appropriate for each ENSO phase (reported in Table 9.2). Although the differences in histori-
cal burn payouts are only marginally significant at best, the insurance rate differs substantially across 
ENSO phases, with the prices appropriate for La Nina phases almost an order of magnitude lower than 
the prices appropriate for El Nino phases. 
5Note that the implemented packages included a bundle of groundnut and maize. We present a hypothetical maize only 
package to allow for clear interpretation of results. We use maize as the example crop for our analysis because it is highly 
sensitive to water stress, represents varieties that have been relatively well characterized for agronomic modeling, requires a 
substantial investment in inputs, and historical data is available for alternative options. 
6If the NINO3.4 sea surface temperature index was more than 0.5 degrees warmer than average the year was categorized as 
El Nino, 0.5 degrees lower, La Nina. The remaining years were categorized as Neutral.
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We proceed to evaluate a set of alternate contract designs in order to understand the potential impacts 
of each strategy. In this exercise, our goal is to identify and illustrate potentially effective strategies that 
could provide a basis for design of an implementable product. 
In a theoretical world, it is trivial to adjust the price of insurance based on new information. However,  
fundamental constraints must be assumed away in order to allow for price changes to not require novel 
design innovations when applied in practice. One key constraint is the absence of a resale option in 
most practical insurance contracts. Insurance differs substantially from derivatives, as derivatives are 
freely traded and can therefore continuously adjust to any information on markets or forecasts. Insur-
ance, on the other hand, is negotiated at a single price between a supplier and large number of retail 
customers and typically cannot be resold by the end user. In addition, for micro-products, the interac-
tion necessary to recruit and process paperwork for a changing number of customers is very expensive. 
Considering that the typical premium is only a few dollars, it is important to have efficient, long term 
relationships with customers. 
We avoid modeling approaches that would lead to results that hinge on assumptions for which we have 
little information, instead basing our analysis on parameters and features observable from the Malawi 
index insurance implementation as much as possible.
We base the comparisons on an indicator of gross revenues that a farmer might enjoy in a given year. 
The gross revenues are calculated using information from the Malawi 2006 contract design process. 
The gross revenues for a given year (in MKW) are the difference between revenues and costs, where 
revenues are the yields in kg multiplied by the price of maize per kg plus any insurance payouts in that 
year. The costs per kg are the summation of the price of inputs, the insurance premium, and interest on 
the farmer’s loan for inputs. For some comparisons we include an additional shadow cost of alternate 
uses for the farmland and labor.9 
7Insurance price in MKW= Average(payout) + Loading * (Value at Risk -Average(Payout)). The Insurance price rate is the 
insurance price in MKW divided by the maximum liability in MKW. Note that although the loading and Value at Risk 
parameters we use were utilized in the design of the 2006 contracts, they are slightly different from the values used for the final 
pricing of the 2006 insurance. We use the pricing utilized in the design work of the 2006 insurance, which is a loading of 6.5% 
and a Value at Risk based on the 99th percentile. 
8Historical burn pricing is performed by relying entirely on payouts determined from historical data, without attempting to 
characterize the underlying distributions. Although this technique may be overly simplistic, we utilize it for two reasons. First, 
it is highly transparent, because it does not require specification of distributional assumptions (except that the set of historical 
draws characterizes the entire distribution). Second, it was the pricing method used for determining the official price of the 
Malawi insurance.
9The price of inputs for 1 acre of maize is 3900 MKW and includes the cost of seeds and fertilizers for the management 
package recommended for the 2006 implementation. The interest was 27.5%. These figures were used in the 2006 package for 
calculating the package prices. The maize price is assumed to be 20 MKW/kg which was a representative price used for the 
designing the 2006 implementation.
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maize prices are volatile and unpredictable partly because of the high level of government and NGO 
intervention in maize markets. Price risk is an important feature in the actual profitability of a real farm; 
it is a topic worthy of a separate study. To the extent that maize markets are closed and local production 
impacts prices, these fluctuations would dampen the ENSO impacts that we model. Instead of at-
tempting to model this process, which would complicate our presentation without providing additional 
insight, we simply state this relationship and recommend that results be viewed with this possibility in 
mind.10 
Since the spirit of our analysis is to provide a basis for an implementable package, we build from the 
Malawi pilot contracts. In the Malawi index insurance implementation the insurance is bundled with 
a loan for inputs. The loan size includes the input costs and insurance premium.11 Since the farmers 
typically do not have legal title to their land, the insurance is used to guarantee the loan by requir-
ing the farmer to purchase insurance so that the maximum liability is equal to the loan size including 
interest. The package is unitary, that is a farmer can only purchase the entire package or nothing. The 
farmer cannot purchase partial packages or multiple packages. Without the loan, farmers are unlikely to 
have the cash necessary to purchase the insurance. Thus the intent of the insurance is to provide access 
to credit to the farmer by eliminating much of the risk faced by the bank due to a farmer defaulting 
because of drought. Missing markets are common in this application. In fact, the primary purpose of 
the insurance is to enable credit markets to exist.
Instead of making the series of uninformed assumptions necessary to characterize farmer demand, we 
use the information that we do have in order to propagate the price changes through the insurance/
loan/input bundle. We rely on the consensus of design constraints for the Malawi package as revealing 
the intersection of contracts within stakeholder preferences. One of the key constraints imposed was 
that the insurance premium was below a maximum acceptable level. In addition, farmers were almost 
universally interested in larger loans while banks imposed the constraint that the loan with interest be 
equal to the maximum liability of the insurance. Therefore we use the cash price of the insurance un-
10Output price stabilization schemes (such as forward pricing) are typically built into micro finance index insurance bundles.
11In addition, in the actual implementation a tax is included. To simplify our presentation we do not include the tax.
Table 9.1 Results of student’s t tests of differences in payouts for years of various ENSO states.
Test df t p-value
La Nina Payouts < Other years 37.7 -1.56 0.06
La Nina Payouts ≠ Other years 37.7 -1.56 0.13
El Nino > Other Years 14.5 0.69 0.25
Neutral > Other Years 42.0 -0.02 0.49
Neutral > La Nina 23.6 1.07 0.15
El Nina > La Nina 11.5 1.16 0.14
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modified by ENSO as a constraint for the premium 
for all phases, and implement ENSO based price 
changes by adjusting the maximum liability, and 
therefore the respective loan size and budget for 
inputs. Thus, in a La Nina year, while a farmer 
would pay the same premium in cash as in the 
non-ENSO adjusted insurance, the farmer would 
be entitled to a larger loan, and therefore a larger 
budget for inputs. 
Table 9.3 presents the elements of a package that 
is scaled to reflect an ENSO based insurance price. 
Holding the cash price of the insurance constant, 
the changing price leads to a maximum liability in 
La Nina years that is almost an order of magnitude 
larger than in other years. Referring to the Input 
Budget Weight row the budget available for inputs 
in a La Nina year is about seven times larger than 
in the non-ENSO adjusted package, with an El 
Nino budget approximately three quarters of the 
nonadjusted package.
Consider a hypothetical farm that allocates its land between ‘local’ maize varieties and production 
practices and hybrid maize production under the input package recommended for the 2006 insurance 
product, with the allocation determined by the size of the budget available for hybrid maize production. 
The benchmark hybrid production level is determined by the budget for the ENSO based price, chang-
ing the acres necessary to expend the seed and fertilizer budget using the per acre levels recommended 
for the 2006 package. 
Without extensive calibration to observed yield, changes in crop simulations are unreliable to predict 
how changes in crop and input use are mapped into yields. For this presentation we utilize histori-
cal hybrid and ‘local’ maize production data to illustrate the potential for gains. Some of the primary 
caveats to keep in mind when interpreting the historical yield results follow. First, it is not known if 
the varieties or practices are the same as the ones utilized in the 2006 package. Second, they represent 
regional averages as opposed to the yields of an individual farmer, so much of the variation that an 
Figure 9.1 Gross Revenue for Standard and ENSO 
adjusted insurance packages.
Table 9.2. Insurance contract characteristics for each ENSO phase.
El Niño La Nina Neutral All
Insurance Rate 0.16 0.02 0.11
Insurance Price 1411 160 1002
Mean Pay 984 108 574
Number of Payments 2 1 3
Number of Years 12 11 22
Pay Frequency 0.17 0.09 0.14
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individual farmer faces will be averaged out. Third, there may be errors in their measurement. Finally, 
they are only available for a short time span, beginning in 1984. 
We apply a series of conservative assumptions that would lead to lower benefit estimates if unrealistic. 
The price the farmer receives for both types of maize is assumed to be the same. The cost of inputs for 
the non-hybrid maize is assumed to be the cost of purchasing (or forgoing the sale of ) market recom-
mended seed at the sale prices that the farmer receives for maize. The quantity of maize seed planted 
per acre is assumed to be equal between hybrid and non-hybrid. The labor required is assumed to be 
similar between hybrid and non-hybrid maize. If the labor requirements for hybrid maize are substan-
tially larger than those for non-hybrid, the benefits of using the forecast would be attenuated.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 9.4 and Figure 9.1 The mean gross revenues for the 
ENSO adjusted package is more than twice the non-adjusted package.
Although these package strategies outlined provide for a relatively stable customer base and amount of 
premiums delivered to the insurance company, they reflect potentially very different values at risk and 
changes in capital necessary for loans and potential insurance payouts that vary with ENSO state. These 
ENSO based variations could provide major challenges for the financial management of the insurance 
providers and lenders. In order to address this problem, insurance providers and lenders could simply 
purchase ENSO indexed insurance or options from re-insurance providers to stabilize finances, since 
ENSO impacts are oppositely correlated across different parts of the world. This provides a natural role 
for reinsurance companies and derivative markets in supporting local microfinance providers.
The results presented here depend not only on parameter assumptions, but also on the assumption 
that future seasonal precipitation will follow the same correlations with ENSO as the small number of 
historical observations that we have had so far. Given the low numbers of observations of ENSO states, 
it is often difficult to find strong statistical test results that imply that it is important to adjust insur-
Table 9.3. Characteristics of a bundled package designed to reflect an ENSO based insurance price.
El Nino La Nina Neutral All
Insurance Rate 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.12
Insurance Price 703 703 703 703
Loan 3515 30916 4949 4603
Interest 967 8502 1361 1266
Input Budget 30213 4246 3900
MaxL 4482 39418 6310 5869
Input Budget Weight 0.72 7.75 1.09 1
Table 9.4. Revenues for Standard and ENSO adjusted insurance packages.
Mean Min Max Var
Standard 12978 6683 19932 14850031.83
ENSO based 37129 6565 152823 2584196785
ENSO/Standard 3 1 8 174.0196125
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ance based on ENSO when historical burn analysis implies substantial impacts. Although we cannot 
guarantee that the future ENSO impacts will be the same, given the potential for strategic behavior and 
the potential risk management benefits one would have to guarantee that future ENSO impacts will 
not in any way follow the behavior of the past in order to proceed without designing ENSO impacts 
into the insurance package. The examples we have presented here demonstrate that even simple, crude, 
and conservative implementable strategies hold the potential for substantial gains through integration 
of forecast information into microfinance insurance packages, suggesting that refined approaches may 
provide greater benefits.
Clearly, the work presented is merely a starting point for forecast based insurance packages. Additional 
research using more sophisticated forecasts and better characterization of the underlying distributions, 
correlations, and skill would be valuable. Breeding programs and agricultural experiments could be 
integrated in this effort to build a portfolio of varieties that could take advantage of ENSO package 
strategies. Of course, for any actual implementation, cooperative research must be done with stakehold-
ers and local experts in order to design truly effective and workable packages, addressing financing 
constraints and price volatility issues, and allowing stakeholders to negotiate packages that represent 
their own preferences. 
10. Description of contract communication tool 
In collaboration with Nicole Peterson of Columbia University’s Center for Research on Environmental 
Decisions (CRED), we created contract calculators and Contract Communication Spreadsheets for 
each of the contracts developed. The Contract Communication Spreadsheet is a tool for understanding 
contracts in terms of money owed and loan reduction, complete with basic instructions on the sheet’s 
use. Each contract presents the indices for each growth phase of the crop. The sheet begins with a sec-
tion listing the size of the loan and the trigger and exit rainfall parameters for each of the crop’s growth 
phases, including information about the sowing condition (Phase 0), which must be met for the other 
phases to begin (if not, the loans are paid by the insurer under a no-sow condition). 
The Contract Communication Spreadsheet also includes a graph of the historical payouts for drought 
insurance contracts for their particular station to give farmers an understanding of the frequency that 
payouts occur, and to demonstrate that majority of years there will be no payout. Many of the important 
features of the insurance are listed on the sheet, such as the failed sowing rule, that rainfall is measured 
at the meteorological station and that individual fields may experience rainfall amounts differing from 
this measurement. Additional clarifications stating that most years farmers will not receive a loan reduc-
tion and that payouts will never exceed the maximum liability are also included.
The farmer is able to calculate her specific loan reduction using the information on the worksheet and 
the rainfall amounts for that year. Using the rainfall amounts for each phase, the farmer follows the in-
structions included in the middle of the worksheet. In brief, she measures the distance from the amount 
of rainfall received, listed on the Y-axis, to the line of insurance. This distance is then placed against a 
scale of currency at the top of the worksheet. The measuring process is carried out for each of the phases 
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to show the total loan reduction that has occurred as a result of insurance payouts throughout the grow-
ing season. Contract communication tools for each contract are included in Appendix 10.
When we presented potential contracts to farmers in this format, farmers immediately offered feed-
back that we then incorporated into the design of the final contracts. All farmers seemed to find the 
worksheet useful for calculating loan amounts, and for understanding the program. Farmer input in 
this regard, was critical in designing an effective contract that met farmer and stakeholder needs. This 
exchange demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach of contract presentation, as farmers appeared 
to clearly understand the insurance being presented to them.
The Contract Calculator Spreadsheet that accompanies the Contract Communication Sheet includes 
all the equations and data necessary to calculate the contract sheet. It includes a scenario section with 
parameters to set in order to determine the actual contract. This section of the calculator includes prices 
and amounts of individual inputs, typical yield size and harvest price, insurance tax and interest, as well 
as the insurance price and desired premium. Another section includes contract information, such as 
phase lengths, triggers, exits, tic size, sowing start and end dates, and the price of insurance. These two 
sections provide the information necessary to complete the calculated values section of the contract 
calculator, where total input price, insurance rate and tax, crop value, loan size and premiums with tax, 
and break-even points are determined per acre. 
We also developed some training materials for those presenting the contracts in an attempt to fill some 
of the gaps in farmer understanding of the contracts. These materials focused on explaining rainfall 
measurements (rain gauges) and contract periods (dekads and phases), as these were two of the most 
confusing or new aspects of the program to farmers. 
Together these sheets provide both an easy means of communicating contract design and function to 
farmers and stakeholders, while serving as potential educational tools to teaching some of the concepts 
and methods used in contract development.
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In this report, we have described our project products to World Bank’s Commodity Risk Manage-ment Group (CMRG) in the development and evaluation of index insurance contracts for small-holder farmers in Malawi, Tanzania, and Kenya. The development of some products we are provid-
ing was supported at no cost by the NSF-funded Center for Research on Environmental Decisions. 
Following the project Terms of Reference, contracts were designed and evaluated for each country. 
Following the project specification, we have developed in depth analysis, such as process based crop 
simulations and quantitative analysis of historical data, for the Malawi case study. These additional 
analyses are unique to the Malawi case, which was selected to be the case study for more in-depth 
analysis.
In general, the contract development and evaluation process has led to a set of contracts that appear 
to perform extremely well. So much so, that demand in many places has overwhelmed administrative 
capacity to serve clients. As this is an unsubsidized product that is purchased by clients, its value can be 
seen in its market demand. Since thousands of loan/insurance bundles have been voluntarily purchased 
by farmers in Malawi, the price that they have paid provides a minimum bound on the value they place 
on the product. In interviews, farmers have stated that their primary strategy for adaptation to climate 
change is enrollment in the insurance program. 
Much of this success is due to the outstanding input and support from project partners, including 
strong data and analysis support from the Malawi, Kenya, and Tanzania Meteorological services. 
Because of their wide range of competencies, it is likely that these Meteorological services could play a 
much expanded role in project scale up.  It is important to ensure that mechanisms exist to provide re-
sources for Meteorological agencies for the necessary data collection, cleaning, reporting, and analyses.
There are several issues that we addressed in evaluating and improving the initial Malawi 2005 pilot 
contract design process for updated contracts in Malawi Kenya and Tanzania. First, the initial Malawi 
contracts had particular features in the formulas that were modified in order to increase robustness, 
performance, flexibility, and transparency. Second, given the deterministic agronomic modeling focus 
in the initial Malawi contract design, it was important to extend the design process to include more 
statistical analysis to arrive at contracts tuned both to agronomic features of crops as well as climate 
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characteristics. We evaluated and improved the crop water stress calculation techniques to more ef-
fectively represent drought related risk in the contract. Since agronomic models have a finite level of 
skill in reflecting actual losses, and since each source of information about losses has limits in terms of 
reliability and accuracy, we developed a systematic design methodology that could utilize the strengths 
of each source of imperfect information. Finally, we provided formal mechanisms to incorporate finan-
cial constraints in the contracts. 
It is important to keep contracts as simple as possible so that the farmer easily understands the details 
of the contract and can accurately gauge his or her own basis risk. The farmer must be able to adjust her 
risk management activities around the capabilities and limitations of the insurance. If the index is too 
complex, the client will not be able to use it as an effective part of the risk management tool kit, poten-
tially ending up with the client not being aware of what risks she is still exposed to.
There are several important issues that have yet to be addressed in the design of future contracts, in 
order to ensure that the product evolves into a fully sustainable and scalable product. Perhaps the most 
important is to build capacity for local design and adaptation of contracts as existing needs change and 
new needs are identified. In addition, the design process must be updated in order to allow informa-
tion in seasonal precipitation forecasts to be utilized in the insurance strategy. Crop breeding programs 
can be integrated into this process, leading to varieties that are adapted to play the best role possible in 
the bundled insurance/credit/forecast system. Contracts could be developed further to more elegantly 
address failed sowing issues and sporadic starts to the rainy season. Index contracts and reinsurance 
must be designed acknowledging regional and global climate features, since large scale climate processes 
typically lead to negatively correlated seasonal rainfall between regions. Work should be done to more 
accurately and transparently characterize the distributions underlying historical precipitation that lead 
to losses and payouts to bring design and pseudo-pricing beyond historical burn analysis to utilize 
Monte Carlo based simulation for improved characterization of risk. Techniques should be developed 
to interpolate information between stations and to use satellite based products. These, and related 
techniques should be advanced to enable a quality product to be established when a new station is 
installed. These techniques would be critical for other issues, such as detecting data tampering, reducing 
basis risk, and perhaps enabling the availability of index products where met stations are not available. It 
is worthwhile to utilize economic contract theory to develop incentives that discourage tampering and 
encourage accurate farm reporting. Contracts could be designed to reveal the value of insurance through 
market transactions. It is important to develop communication tools for cooperative design, education 
of contract issues, and exercises to test for farmer understanding of products. Indexes should be explored 
to cover additional risks, such as excess rainfall. 
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APPENDIx I. 
DESCRIPTION OF All CONTRACTS
Malawi contracts
Following the design process described earlier, the contracts designed for Malawi use the weighted, 
daily WRSI model in conjunction with the input from agronomists and feedback received from farmers 
and stakeholders. Experts from NASFAM, ICRISAT and Chitedze research stations were consulted, 
as well as agrometeorologists in the Malawi Met service. We participated in two cooperative design 
sessions with farmer groups. We evaluated and redesigned contracts using this feedback. In addition, 
contracts were evaluated against more complex crop models and historical data. The following tables 
present contract parameters for each of the contracts designed, as well as key indicators of contract 
quality, such as timing and frequency of payouts and the correlation between payouts and losses. Given 
the payment frequency of some of the contracts and the limited time span of historical yields, it was 
possible for a contract to have no payouts during the time span covered by yield data. For these con-
tracts it was not possible to study the correlation between payouts and historical yields.
In Malawi, two crops were addressed, groundnuts and maize. Because groundnuts and maize have 
very different drought vulnerabilities, different strategies were used in the contract design. The drought 
sensitivity of maize is largely determined through the genetics of the variety selected. Maize is most 
sensitive to drought during tasseling and filling with some sensitivity during early establishment. Fol-
lowing tasseling and filling, the crop has very little drought sensitivity. The timing of these phases is 
determined almost entirely by the genetics of the crop. Therefore, the maize contracts were designed to 
target protection into the second phase, which was timed to cover tasseling and filling. 
Groundnuts are more flexible in the timing of drought stress. If growth is stunted by drought early in 
the season, the plants will take advantage of rainfall that occurs later. In addition, historical dry spells 
often occurred late in the season, when the groundnuts were more resistant to drought stress. This is to 
be expected when a variety is well adapted to the local climate. The design strategy arrived at following 
discussions with farmers and agronomic experts was to target two types of risks with the contract. The 
first risk targeted was for relatively common but non-catastrophic events of yield reduction associated 
with the dry spells occurring late in the season. The second risk targeted was for protection from only 
the most severe events arising from the years with the driest spells in earlier parts of the season, which 
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would lead to catastrophic losses. The farmers very clearly communicated a demand for the mix of these 
two risks that could be covered with the premium price constraint. 
Groundnut contracts for Malawi have low trigger levels in the first two phases, which is when the 
groundnut crop is most vulnerable to drought. Thus, the main purpose of these phases is to protect 
against a catastrophic event. The third phase of the groundnut contracts has a higher trigger, and is 
where majority of the contracts’ payouts are most likely to occur. By the incorporation of the higher 
trigger in the third phase, this design allows farmers to receive smaller, more frequent payouts, a balance 
demanded by farmers and other stakeholders (see Reference Section 1). In the following figures, the 
y-axis is the loss proxy described in Reference Section 5: Loss Proxy and the x-axis represents the year 
of harvest.
Kasungu maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.413
1 1--5 50 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years 83.3
2 6--8 80 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) 0.12
3 9--12 30 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) NA
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price NA
Payout Rate 0.136
Figure A.1.1 Kasungu maize loss and payouts as determined 
using Daily, weighted WRSI 
Figure A1.2 Payouts and historical losses for Kasungu maize 
crop 
Kasungu Groundnut
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.392
1 1--3 40 30 Percent Payout in 1/4 Driest Years 60
2 4--6 40 30 Correlation (Historical) 0.234
3 7--14 190 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 25
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.07
Payout Rate 0.227
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Figure A1.3 Simulated losses and payouts for Kasungu ground-
nut contract 
Figure A1.4. Payouts and historical losses for Kasungu ground-
nut contract
Chitedze maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.42
1 1--5 40 30 Percent Payout in 1/4 Driest Years 30
2 6--8 125 30 Correlation (Historical) 0.099
3 9--12 25 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 0.528
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 100
Payout Rate 0.222
FigureA1.5. Simulated losses and payouts for Chitedze maize 
contract
Figure A1.6. Payouts and historical losses for Chitedze maize 
contract
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Figure A.1.7 Simulated losses and payouts for Chitedze 
groundnut contract 
Figure A1.8. Payouts and historical losses for Chitedze ground-
nut contract
Chitedze Groundnut
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.549
1 1--3 35 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 77.8
2 4--6 35 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) 0.664
3 7--14 220 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 50
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.076
Payout Rate 0.2
Lilongwe maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.591
1 1--5 40 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 58.33
2 6--8 130 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) 0.554
3 9--12 25 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 100
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.090
Payout Rate 0.267
Figure A1.9. Simulated losses and payouts for Lilongwe maize 
contract 




Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.464
1 1--3 40 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 58.33
2 4--6 40 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) 0.146
3 7--14 230 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 25
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.068
Payout Rate 0.267
Figure A.1.11 Simulated losses and payouts for Lilongwe 
groundnut contract 
Figure A1.12. Payouts and historical losses for Lilongwe 
groundnut contract
Nkhotakota maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.686
1 1--4 150 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 72.7
2 5--7 140 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) -0.376
3 8--12 50 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 0
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.115
Payout Rate 0.244
Figure A1.13. Simulated losses and payouts for Nkhotakota 
maize contract 




Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.409
1 1--3 120 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 36.36
2 4--6 120 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) 0.588
3 7--14 240 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) 40
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.047
Payout Rate 0.244
Figure A1.15 Simulated losses and payouts for Nkhotakota 
groundnut contract
Figure A1.16 Payouts and historical losses for Nkhotakota 
groundnut contract
Mchinji maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.704
1 1--5 100 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 71.43
2 6--8 110 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA
3 9--12 140 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) NA
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.132
Payout Rate 0.25




Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.283
1 1--3 100 30 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 50
2 4--6 70 30 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA
3 7--14 170 20 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) NA
Sowing Window 11--17 Sowing Requirement 25 Pseudo Price 0.055
Payout Rate 0.148
Figure A1.18. Simulated losses and payouts for Mchinji 
groundnut contract
Tanzania
In Tanzania, the crop insured was maize. The contracts were designed to cover maize grown during the 
long rainy season. Because the 3rd phase of the maize growing cycle is not associated with significant 
yield stress, stakeholders chose to eliminate that phase from the contract and a two phase contract was 
designed. For Tanzania we did not have information on historical yields or crop simulations, so con-
tracts were designed using the WRSI based model, supporting documents (Technoserve 2006), discus-
sion with agronomists, agrometerologists and feedback obtained in four cooperative design sessions 
with groups of farmers and local extension experts. In addition, remotely sensed approximations for 
PET were necessary, since local stations did not have the necessary sensors (see Appendix 4. Potential 
Evaporation). Because historical yields were not available, cooperative design meetings with farmers 
and agrometeorologists were relied upon heavily. The time-varying parameters and sowing conditions 
in the crop loss simulation were verified against farmer reported sowing dates and phenology, with 
slight adjustments made in the model timing. We participated in four cooperative design meetings with 
farmers. Contracts were adjusted to reflect farmer reported sowing dates and phenology and to target 
payouts more closely to drought stress years reported by farmers for the phase in which they reported 
stress. This exercise led to contracts that yielded higher correlations at lower costs than costs determined 
prior to the adjustments.
 
Insurance company stakeholders indicated a preference for less expensive contracts with similar payout 
rates to the contracts presented below. The prices of both contracts could be lowered while maintaining 
a similar payout rate by lowering or eliminating the exits and manipulating the payout for the no sowing 
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condition. The price of the Babati contract could be decreased by lowering the phase 2 trigger to 100, 
which would lead to a 20% payout rate and a premium of 4.6%, while continuing to payout in key years 
with a good correlation between payouts and losses. This change would likely not provide enough insur-
ance to cover the entirety of the loan. 
Mbulu is more expensive because of the sowing failure. Lowering the phase two trigger for Mbulu to 
155 is another method of decreasing the price of that contract. When this is done, a correlation of over 
50% between payouts and losses remains, and the price drops to 6.5%, while continuing to pay out 
in key years. This change does result in a decrease in payout frequency to 20%. Another possibility to 
lower the price of the Mbulu contract is through lowering the payouts for occurrences in the no sowing 
condition. All of the modifications suggested for decreasing the price of either contract are not due to 
efficiency gains but instead are simply offering less coverage.
Babati maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.652
1 1--4 80 0 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 60
2 5--9 120 10 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA
Sowing Window 16--20 Sowing Requirement 25 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs (Hist) NA
Pseudo Price 0.1
Payout Rate 0.385
Figure A1.19 Simulated losses and payouts for Babati maize 
contract
Mbulu maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.572
1 1--5 30 0 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 83.33
2 6--12 170 10 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA




Figure A1.20. Simulated losses and payouts for Mbulu maize 
contractcontract
Kenya
In Kenya, contracts were developed for maize grown in the long rainy season. As with Tanzania, the 
contracts designed for Kenya also do not cover the final growth stage of the maize. Because the growing 
was very long, the phonological stages that had been addressed in the first two phases of the Malawi 
and Tanzania contracts were subdivided, leading to three phase contracts for Kenya with coverage that 
stopped before the final maturation growing stage. This allows for the isolation of more dry spells during 
the most vulnerable period of the crop’s growth so that dry spells can be identified in phase totals in 
spite of the long season.
Historical yield data was not available. Farmer feedback was obtained by consultants using the discus-
sion questions listed in Appendix 7. This information was reported in (Concept 2006). Direct interac-
tion between contract designers and farmers would have been preferable, if possible
The development of contracts in Kenya was particularly challenging because of the very long season and 
relatively high levels of rainfall. Because the WRSI based water stress simulation did not detect drought 
sensitivity, we utilized a pseudo WRSI to yield a model with an enhanced response to dry spells. This 
enhanced sensitivity was obtained by applying a reduction factor for the water holding capacity param-
eter. Because the role of the WRSI based model in the contract design is to provide a relative ranking of 
drought related stress during the season across years, artificially enhancing the response of the model to 
water stress does not systematically bias the contract design. Its role in the design process is to provide a 
benchmark for targeting protection to the vulnerabilities that are relatively more important. By increas-
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ing the sensitivity of the model, the relative vulnerabilities are amplified, allowing this targeting. The 
adjusted models would be inappropriate for any use in which absolute levels are important, as opposed 
to ranking relative risks. 
 
It is critical to verify that these adjustments lead to models that predict actual drought based losses. It 
is entirely possible that drought stress is not an important risk for the farms being addressed. Since the 
drought risk in for the Kenya sites considered was so subtle that the WRSI based model needed to be 
adjusted to enhance risk, it is important that the stresses that they identify be verified using field infor-
mation or interviews with farmers, and contracts adapted based on feedback. Implementation of these 
contracts should not occur unless the drought stress covered is verified to exist and be well correlated 
with model payouts. 
Contracts are designed to provide the most cost effective coverage given a particular price target. Thus, a 
contract will not be less expensive in regions with less drought risk unless the price target is explicitly set 
lower. For the contracts in this report, the insurance is typically designed to only cover losses to a level 
that would be necessary to meet input costs. In scenarios for which losses may be small, it is important 
to verify that they are indeed larger than the payouts. This is particularly true for the contracts being 
designed for Kenya.
In this context of long seasons with high levels of rainfall, alternate strategies may be more effective 
than the three phase contracts. Insurance triggered off of dry spells may be worthwhile to investigate. 
Alternately, it may be preferable to focus on areas of Kenya that have more dramatic drought stress. 
The contracts developed for Eldoret and Kitale do perform well against the enhanced sensitivity WRSI 
simulations, so if the drought stresses can be verified, these locations have the potential for worthwhile 
contracts. The contract for Nakuru does not perform well, and additional information and design work 
would be necessary to arrive at a contract for that location. The project is currently exploring the pos-
sibility of alternative contracts and sites as it proceeds toward implementation.
Eldoret maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.586
1 1--4 300 0 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 80
2 5--10 500 0 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA
3 11--16 900 0 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) NA




Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.587
1 1--4 600 0 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 50
2 5--10 1200 0 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA
3 11--16 1500 0 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) NA
Sowing Window 8--12 Sowing Requirement 80 Pseudo Price 0.048
Payout Rate 0.381
Nakuru maize
Phase Phase length (dekad) Trigger (mm) Exit (mm) Correlation 0.254
1 1--3 300 0 Percent of Payouts in 1/4 Driest Yrs 37.5
2 4--6 375 0 Correlation (Historical Loss) NA
3 7--12 750 0 Percent Payouts in 1/4 Driest Years (Hist) NA
Sowing Window 10--12 Sowing Requirement 80 Pseudo Price 0.045
Payout Rate 0.25
Figure A1.22. Simulated losses and payouts for Nakuru maize 
contract
Figure A1.21. Simulated losses and payouts for Eldoret maize 
contract
APPENDIx II.  
PSEUDO-PRICING AlTERNATIvES PURSUED
This section provides additional background on the pseudo pricing algorithm and alternative specifica-
tions investigated in the design process. It is important to note that the alternative pricing specifications 
were not utilized in the final contract design. They are presented here only to provide a full reporting of 
the activities completed. The more sophisticated pseudo pricing strategies were not selected for several 
reasons. They were less transparent (and less easily calculated in tools such as excel). In addition, because 
many of the techniques were based on Monte Carlo draws, the identical contract would have slightly 
different prices each time it was evaluated unless very large samples were drawn. This meant that use 
of the alternative pricing strategies in the design optimization software was computationally very 
expensive without leading to contracts that were much different from simple and transparent pseudo 
pricing formulae. For the future, alternate methods of addressing the limited sample size issues would 
be worthwhile to pursue. Based on the experience of this project, it is recommended that simulations be 
performed for precipitation (as opposed to pricing) in order to utilize as much historical information as 
possible.
The price of insurance usually depends on the expected payouts from the product, and a loading factor 
or margin reflecting the insurer’s preferences, their ability to handle risks, and the environment in which 
the operations take place. The later is sometimes referred to as the cost of risk. In practice, premiums are 
frequently obtained using the following formula (CRMG 2006 ), Premium=E(P)+Risk Margin, where 
E(P) denotes expected payouts and the Risk Margin is based on subjective considerations. For this work, 
the Risk Margin term was determined using the Return on Value at Risk (VaR) method. The VaRx is 
defined as the loss that will not be exceeded with x% confidence level (Hull 1998). In this framework, 
the risk margin takes the form, 
where b , the “cost of VaR” (CRMG 2006 ) was set at 6%, and x at 99%. Hence the equation used to 
price the insurance is 
(1)
The remaining parameters needed to determine the insurance price, namely the expected payout and the 
VaR are commonly obtained using either the historical burn approach, or by fitting probability distribu-
1
2
tions that are consistent with the observed payouts that would have occurred had the insurance been 
in place before. The distribution obtained through the later approach is then used to obtain expected 
payouts and the VaR at the desired confidence level through Monte Carlo analysis. For the historical 
burn approach, the parameters are obtained directly from the payouts that would have resulted if the 
insurance was in place in the past. 
For the final contract optimization algorithm selected, the historical burn approach was used. Although 
this is likely to less accurately reflect the risks faced by the insurer, it is a more transparent and robust 
measure of trade-offs (as opposed to absolute levels). The goal of the design process is to provide a stan-
dardized pseudo price measure for the trade-offs in risk instead of precisely pricing the risk faced by the 
insurer. Upon completion of the design process, it is the responsibility of the financial partners involved 
to determine an accurate price for the final product using more detailed techniques. The advantage of 
using the historical burn pseudo price is that it is exactly repeatable (as opposed to a Monte Carlo based 
analysis) and transparent. It can be duplicated in less sophisticated software that is commonly available, 
such as Excel, without the need for extensions.
Because it is likely that the official price will exceed the pseudo-price, e.g. because of taxes and fees, it 
is important to design contracts with a pseudo-price that is below what stakeholders are willing to pay. 
For this application, the pseudo price of the insurance was obtained based on insurance rates, a measure 
of the price per unit of insurance (or protection). We first divide Equation (1) by the maximum payout 
(liability, L) of the insurance, to obtain
  . (2)
Equation (2) indicates that the insurance rate is the sum of the actuarially fair insurance rate r and a 
loading factor l. For the approach, per year payouts based on historical rainfall values were divided by 
the liability of the product. The resulting values (which by construction fall in the 0-1 interval) were 
then used to either fit a distribution to conduct the Monte Carlo simulations or to apply the historical 
burn approach to obtain the expected payout per unit of insurance r as well as the per unit VaR, Var99/L. 
After obtaining these values, the price of insurance is obtained by multiplying the loaded rate by the 
liability to get Premium=(r+l)*L. 
Two different distributions (exponential and beta) were programmed in the code, as well as two dif-
ferent choices for the maximum payout, namely the liability of the contract and maximum payout that 
would have occurred based on historical data. The code also gives the user the option to use a different 
risk margin or loading factor based on the standard deviation of payouts. Under this alternative method, 
the resulting price of insurance is,
 where a is known as the Sharpe Ratio, and s(P) is the standard deviation of payouts. The user has the 
option of changing both a and b from the VaR method. 
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The pricing functions encoded followed several steps to calculate pseudo prices. In order to make the 
function more general and less dependent on the actual units of the data, we work with the more com-
monly used insurance rates as opposed to actual values. Historical payouts are divided by the liability of 
the product. There is an option to divide by the maximum observed payouts, if deemed more appropri-
ate for the application at hand. The resulting vector will contain a series of zeros and a series of values 
between zero and one. 
When the historical burn method is used, both the statistics needed for the pricing described above are 
obtained directly from this vector. When Monte Carlo analysis is used, there are different options to fit 
two different distributions to the nonzero payouts from this vector. Two distributions, frequently used 
in practice for insurance pricing were coded. Given that the values of non-zero payouts will be con-
tained in the zero-one interval, and the probability density function (pdf ) of positive payouts usually has 
a downward slope, we selected the beta and exponential distributions. The beta distribution is strictly 
contained in the 0-1 interval, and has the flexibility to reflect different distributional shapes, including a 
downward sloping pdf. The exponential function is very simple to fit, and also has a downward sloping 
pdf. The values of an exponential are not confined to the zero-one interval, but for most applications 
this would not cause any problems. In applications, in which the fitted exponential parameters might 
result in sampling values greater than 1, the code will discard the value and replace it with a one. If this 
occurs frequently, it may be more appropriate to use the beta distribution option. Other distributions 
could be easily coded into the function. 
Once the parameters for the distribution are fitted (the code does it through maximum likelihood), they 
are used to obtain a large sample of positive payouts per unit of insurance. The payouts are placed in a 
vector with a number of zeros, in a way to maintain the proportion of zeros and positive payouts ob-
served in the original data. Note that the function restricts the simulated data to have the same propor-
tion of zeros and nonzero values as the original data. The average of this vector is the expected insurance 
rate introduced above. Both the VaR (at a user specified confidence level) and the standard deviation per 
unit of insurance are obtained.
The function then returns the loaded premium rate for the sharpe ratio, and Return of VaR (outlined 
above for both a user specified confidence level and by replacing the VaR by the maximum historical per 
unit payout), using the values of a or b selected by the user. To obtain the final premium the loaded rate 
must be multiplied by either the liability or the maximum observed payout, depending on which was 
used to normalize the payouts initially. 
Monte Carlo analysis based directly on rainfall levels (as opposed to the limited dataset of historical 
burn payouts) is likely to be worthwhile in better characterizing the risks faced, and we therefore recom-
mend that this be pursued for future contract design processes. 
APPENDIx III. vARyING yIElD STRESS IN 
WRSI BASED lOSS CAlCUlATIONS 
The WRSI model used in the development of the initial Malawi contracts was an un-weighted, 
dekadal model, described in detail in the WRSI appendix of the Terms of Reference for this 
project. Standard, un-weighted, WRSI is calculated by determining the ratio of actual to poten-
tial evapotranspiration of a crop over each time period. From this, crop yield is estimated using 
an equation where a single crop coefficient (Ky) represents the seasonal yield-response factors of 
that crop. Standard, un-weighted WRSI is calculated using the equation:
 
where ETa and ETp represent the actual and potential evapotranspiration of the crop over a time 
period i. The final WRSI from the end of the season is then used to calculate crop yield, using 
the following equation:
Crop Yield = 1 – (1- WRSI)* seasonal Ky * Maximum Potential Yield
 The single value of allowable water deficit (Ky) used in this equation is determined by averaging 
the crop’s water requirement for the entire growing season. Since a crop’s response to water defi-
cit varies depending on what stage of growth it is in during the period of deficit, the single Ky 
value does not adequately represent a crop’s water requirement throughout the growing season. 
Similarly, the length of the dekad does not adequately capture fluctuations in crop-response to 
rainfall deficit.  
 
After estimating the variables used to generate WRSI, the relative crop yield (RY), which 
reflects the varying crop water stress vulnerability, is estimated using the following equation:
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where Ky is the Ky value for the day i and where w is the daily weight, introduced to incorporate the 
daily importance of “Ky” in crop yield estimation and calculated as
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APPENDIx Iv.  
POTENTIAl EvAPOTRANSPIRATION
In the contract design, dekadal potential evapotranspiration was produced for Malawi and Kenya by the 
Malawi and Kenya National Met services. This information was not available in Tanzania because the 
appropriate sensors did not exist for the met stations being studied. For these sites we used the NOAA 
NCEP-NCAR CDAS-1 monthly diagnostic surface potential evaporation climatology evaporation 
data, measured in watts/ m^2, to run the crop loss financing model. This is a global gridded dataset 
available through sources such as the IRI data library. Following (Ebisuzaki 2006) we converted the 
watts per m^2 evaporation data of the NOAA NCEP-NCAR CDAS-1 data into mm/day by multiply-
ing the reported latent heat flux (W/m^2) by 0.03456, a conversion factor determined by the following 
equation:
1 W/m/m * (1 / Latent heat at 0C) * (1/ density of water) * (seconds / day) * (mm/m) *1 ( J/m/m/s) * (1/2.5e6 
kg/J) (1/1e3 m*m*m/kg) * (24*60* 60 second / day) * (1000 mm/m) 
= 0.03456 mm/day
This conversion assumes that both the density of water and the latent heat of evaporation are constant 
(Ebisuzaki 2006).
To download, go to: http://iridl.ldeo.columbia.edu/expert
And paste this in, with the desired lat/lon in the x, y below. Final data can be downloaded from the data 
library:
SOURCES .NOAA .NCEP-NCAR .CDAS-1 .MONTHLY .Diagnostic .surface .potential .evap
 T ( Jan 1960) (last) RANGE 
 X (35.6) VALUE 





The Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT) is a software that uses crop, soil, 
and weather databases in combination with crop models to simulate outcomes of crop management 
strategies. The DSSAT crop models are more detailed crop models than the WRSI equation, as they 
simulate the biological processes in the plant, as opposed to simply performing water balance ac-
counting. They include more variables than water availability in their estimates of crop yields. DSSAT 
consists of eight modules: a Land Module; Management Module; a Soil Module made up of two soil 
nitrogen and organic matter modules and a soil water balance sub-module; a Weather Module capable 
of reading or generating daily weather data; a Soil-Plant-Atmosphere Module that accounts for the 
competition for light and water between the soil, plants, and the atmosphere; the CROPGRO Plant 
Growth Module which simulates the growth of grain legumes, vegetables, and grasses; the CERES 
Plant Growth Module which simulates growing grain cereals; and the SUBSTOR Plant Growth 
Module, used to simulate potato growth.
Ideally extensive calibration and verification against observed crop growth in a controlled setting is 
performed prior to use of the system in predicting plant behavior. In order to calibrate and run the crop 
models an array of data is required, with simulation results sensitive to parameter assumptions. Weather 
data for the duration of the growing season and preferably beginning a few weeks prior to planting and 
extending a few weeks after harvest is needed. This includes daily values of incoming solar radiation, 
maximum and minimum air temperatures, and daily rainfall. Optional data includes dry and wet bulb 
temperatures and wind speed.
Soil data is required, including soil classification, surface slope, color, permeability, drainage class, soil 
profile data by soil horizon. The soil profile data consists of upper and lower horizon drainage depths, 
percentage sand silt and clay content, 1/3 bar bulk density, organic carbon, pH in water, aluminum 
saturation, and root abundance information. Finally, management and experiment data is required, 
including planting date, planting density, row spacing, planting depth, crop variety, irrigation, and fertil-
izer practices.
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APPENDIx vI.  
DATA REqUIREMENTS 
Minimal data requirements to run prototype contract generation software consists of the following 
information:
Historical daily rainfall amounts at each station. 
The most convenient format for us is a comma separated file for each station using the format below. 
Leap day is left blank for non leap years.
Climatological ET over the growing season (average potential et for each time period during the 
growing season, dekadal time periods are acceptable). If there are complexities in the provision of this, it 
would be worthwhile to have a dialog with the provider over the best methods of generation and what 
types of data is available to use for generating ET.
Phenology for each station and crop, and variety
This would include the start of the growing season, the approximate time of flowering, and the length 
of the growing season. If locally adjusted Kc and Ky coefficients are available for the WRSI model, 
those would be useful. If time from sowing to germination is available, that would be of use as well.
Sowing window and sowing rules
In Malawi, the sowing rule was a minimum amount of rainfall per dekad in the sowing window. Each 
contract would require a sowing rule.
Water holding capacity (WHC, in mm per m) at each station
If there is a soil depth or similar constraint on water storage, this information would also be necessary.
Table 7.1 Format for daily rainfall data to run prototype contract generation software.
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
1-Jan 11.4 6.6 21.8 0 20.6 0 0
2-Jan 1.5 27.2 29 3 15 0.5 0
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Values to assume for:
Soil Water Content Fraction, Maximum Crop Root Depth (m), Effective Crop Root Depth 
The parameters are described in Term Sheet Example: Malawi Transaction Appendix 1. The parameters 
presented in that document will be used if local parameters are not available. 
Costs of inputs and price per kg of yields (optional if not building bundled loan package) 
Approximate yield levels without water stress (optional if not building bundled loan package)
Contracts can be developed without the data below, but their availability allows much greater quality 
contracts to be developed.
Historical harvest data
Station location, elevation
Typical practices, inputs used
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APPENDIx vII. 
COOPERATIvE DESIGN qUESTIONNAIRE 
The following example is from the INITIAL QUESTIONS FOR FIELD WORK IN KENYA 13-2-
07 (Bryla 2007)
Discussion of clients’ risks, income generating activities, access to finance, and production approaches
Income
• What are your main sources of income?
• How much of your income comes from the production and sale of maize?
• How much of your maize do you sell vs. consume?
• What are your main sales markets? Who do you sell your maize to? 
• On average what are the prices you receive for you maize? Recent years high vs. low.
• Do you do any forward contracting for the maize?
Risk
• What are your biggest risks to your income? Weather, price, etc
• How do you currently manage risk? 
• What are the specific weather risks that maize production faces?
• Drought – When during the season?
• Excess Rain – If ever, when during the season?
• Temperature - If ever, when during the season?
Access to Finance
• Do you receive financing for this production?
• From who?
• What type of financing? What are the terms?
• Are you interested in accessing additional financing for production?
• What time of year is the financing received?
• What types of collateral do you normally provide?
Production
• What type of maize do you plant? Hybrid, opv, local? 
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• What type of fertilizers or inputs do you use? When are they applied during the season? What are 
the costs of these inputs?
• What is the typical planting period for maize? 
• What is the earliest date that you have planted and what year was that in?
• What is the latest date you have planted, and what year was that in?
• When does your hybrid maize typically tassle and fill?
• When do you typically harvest?
Detailed explanation of the product - talking points rather then questions
• Product is based on an index where a rainfall index acts as proxy for yield rather then measuring 
yield itself
• Farmers must be somewhat confident the rainfall on their farm is similar to rainfall at the weather 
station
• Basis risk is present and could affect the effectiveness of the contract
• Insure premiums require an upfront cash payment and are non refundable
• Index insurance only covers the named peril for which it was designed and other risks could cause 
yield losses for which the farmer will not be covered 
• Product is commercially based and not subsidized
 Discussion of the contract parameters 
• What are the best years and the worst years for maize production that you can remember?
• What made these years the best and worst years? What were the specific events that caused yield to 
be good or bad?
• Does the dynamic sowing period reflect your sowing practices? Ie do you wait for the first rains to 
sow?
• How do you judge when rain is sufficient for planting?
• What do you do if rains are insufficient for planting? Plant a different crop vs plant anyway etc?
• Is sowing and tasseling the two times when you feel that they are most vulnerable to drought?
• If there is a different part of the growing season in which your crops have been vulnerable to 
drought, what is this part, what month(s) does it occur, and in what years has it been a problem?
• In which years did you have yield problems because of drought, and for each year, what was the 
reason for the problem (eg dry sowing/weak start of rains or drought during the filling phase)?
• Do the historical payouts match the years in which you would have expected a payout?
 Discussion of Willingness to pay
• Would you be willing to pay for the insurance product that was described above?
• How much would you be willing to pay? In absolute terms and percentage basis.
• Would you be willing to pay if you could get a loan for the cost of the premium?
• Would you be willing to pay if this would give you access to a loan for inputs?
• If not from loans where would you get the cash to pay for the premium?
APPENDIx vIII. INITIAl ExPlORATIONS OF 
FAIlED SOWING 
We performed exploratory analysis into alternative techniques that might be applicable for insuring 
failed sowing events. Although we did not implement changes in the contracts based on this analysis, 
it is possible that a simple rule based on the number of days when WRSI equaled zero during the first 
week of sowing may be effective. An example illustration of this criterion is below. The results of this are 
shown for Lilongwe in Figure A8.1. We then compared the number of years when WRSI equaled zero 
for different time-spans within the first week after sowing, as shown in Figure A8.2. It is possible that 
dry spell measure based on strings of days with WRSI of zero may be a worthwhile index to pursue for 
failed sowing or crop failure if the methods currently used are not sufficiently effective for a particular 
application.










































































































Figure A9.1 Lilongwe groundnut crop yields as estimated using dekadal and daily WRSI with average and 4-stage Ky values, and 
the DSSAT crop model
Table A9.1 Statistical Comparison for DSSAT crop yield and decadal and daily WRSI based crop yield using average Ky and 4-
stage Ky values for Lilongwe groundnut crop.
DSSAT Crop Yield Dekadal CPI (av Ky) Dekadal CPI (4 Kys) Daily CPI (av Ky) Daily CPI (4 Kys)
Min 700 710 799 670 762
Max 6266 1000 998 970 990
Average 4381 890 927 811 871
STDEV 1241 64.6 49.3 66.2 53.0
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Table A9.2 Statistical comparison of decadal and daily WRSI based crop yields using average Ky and 4-stage Ky values and the 
DSSAT crop model for Kasungu groundnut crop.
DSSAT Crop Yield Dekadal CPI (av Ky) Dekadal CPI (4 Ky) Daily CPI (av Ky) Daily CPI (4 Ky)
Min 447 500 594 450 581
Max 6248 1000 999 950 977
Average 3670 870 912 796 861
STDEV 1766 96.3 77.4 85.0 70.8
CV 0.48 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.08
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Figure A9.3 Nkhotakota groundnut crop yields as estimated using dekadal and daily WRSIwith average and 4-stage Ky vales, and 
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Table A9.3 Statistical comparison of decadal and daily WRSI based crop yields using average Ky and 4-stage Ky values and the 
DSSAT crop model for Kasungu groundnut crop.
DSSAT Crop Yield Dekadal CPI (av Ky) Dekadal CPI (4 Ky) Daily CPI (av Ky) Daily CPI (4 Ky)
Min 2553 770 793 740 766
Max 6559 1000 1000 1000 1000
Average 4931 959 968 891 920
STDEV 933 55.3 47.4 60.6 50.4
CV 0.198 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05

Figure 9.4 Lilongwe maize yields as estimated using daily and dekadal WRSI with average and 4-stage Ky values, and DSSAT 
crop model.


































Daily CPI (4 Ky) Dekadal CPI (av Ky)






































Dekadal CPI (av Ky) Daily CPI (av Ky) Daily CPI (4 Ky) DSSAT Crop Yield

Figure 9.6 Kasungu maize crop yields estimated from Dekadal and Daily WRSI using average Ky and 4-stage Ky values, and the 
DSSAT crop model.
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APPENDIx x. 
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